APA 6th Edition Burger, H. (1995). KONSTRUKTIVISTIČKA ANTROPOLOGIJA VREMENA GÜNTERA DUXA. Socijalna ekologija, 4 (1), 53-68. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/141348
MLA 8th Edition Burger, Hotimir. "KONSTRUKTIVISTIČKA ANTROPOLOGIJA VREMENA GÜNTERA DUXA." Socijalna ekologija, vol. 4, br. 1, 1995, str. 53-68. https://hrcak.srce.hr/141348. Citirano 04.07.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Burger, Hotimir. "KONSTRUKTIVISTIČKA ANTROPOLOGIJA VREMENA GÜNTERA DUXA." Socijalna ekologija 4, br. 1 (1995): 53-68. https://hrcak.srce.hr/141348
Harvard Burger, H. (1995). 'KONSTRUKTIVISTIČKA ANTROPOLOGIJA VREMENA GÜNTERA DUXA', Socijalna ekologija, 4(1), str. 53-68. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/141348 (Datum pristupa: 04.07.2020.)
Vancouver Burger H. KONSTRUKTIVISTIČKA ANTROPOLOGIJA VREMENA GÜNTERA DUXA. Socijalna ekologija [Internet]. 1995 [pristupljeno 04.07.2020.];4(1):53-68. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/141348
IEEE H. Burger, "KONSTRUKTIVISTIČKA ANTROPOLOGIJA VREMENA GÜNTERA DUXA", Socijalna ekologija, vol.4, br. 1, str. 53-68, 1995. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/141348. [Citirano: 04.07.2020.]
Sažetak Classics of philosophical anthropology have prepared a specific anthropological apprehension of time, but we do not find with Scheller, nor with Plessner or Gehlen any deduced theory of time. G. Dux, continuing with these insights but also fitting them into contemporary conceptions, developed a certain anthropology of time as a cognitive construction in the framework of a certain genetic and historical theory of mind. The theory is genetically based in ontogenesis, where it aspires to show re-establishing of basic competencies and structures, among them being time also. A man has to, Dux shows, develop his own categorial temporalness in order to develop his own form of link of his biological system in interaction with nature.
Dux's interesting and complex realization opens many questions. Considering the notion of a subject articulated in philosophy and elaborated especially from Kant to Hegel, and also subsequently, as "a competence for the universal", a question is raised whether this competence is constitutive for time. Considering that Dux tells about time of the universe, a question is raised whether an autopoeticality should be attributed to the universe. Furthermore, if the time is a cognitive construct, what is then about noncognitive types of time the author is talking about too, what about a typology of activity and a possible typology of time. It seems that Dux had to pay too great a price for understanding a subject as a construct, for hence time could be deducible only as a construct.