APA 6th Edition Gavran Miloš, A. (2015). Epicurean Perceptual Content. Prolegomena, 14 (2), 167-191. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/150931
MLA 8th Edition Gavran Miloš, Ana. "Epicurean Perceptual Content." Prolegomena, vol. 14, br. 2, 2015, str. 167-191. https://hrcak.srce.hr/150931. Citirano 22.09.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Gavran Miloš, Ana. "Epicurean Perceptual Content." Prolegomena 14, br. 2 (2015): 167-191. https://hrcak.srce.hr/150931
Harvard Gavran Miloš, A. (2015). 'Epicurean Perceptual Content', Prolegomena, 14(2), str. 167-191. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150931 (Datum pristupa: 22.09.2020.)
Vancouver Gavran Miloš A. Epicurean Perceptual Content. Prolegomena [Internet]. 2015 [pristupljeno 22.09.2020.];14(2):167-191. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150931
IEEE A. Gavran Miloš, "Epicurean Perceptual Content", Prolegomena, vol.14, br. 2, str. 167-191, 2015. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/150931. [Citirano: 22.09.2020.]
Sažetak Epicurean epistemology is usually summarised in a controversial thesis according to which all perceptions are true. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but is supported with some serious arguments. In the paper, I examine the thesis according to which “all perceptions are true”, but my main focus is to analyse the content of Epicurean perception through the following questions: (i) what kind of content do Epicurean perceptions have; (ii) what are the proper objects of perception; (iii) can we ascribe to such content truth and falsity? In the first part, I say something general about the thesis and point out some basic characteristics of perceptions due to which they serve as a criterion of truth. Next I try to show that the proper objects of perceptions are eidola and not external objects because only in that case can Epicurus maintain the truth of all perceptions, including illusions, hallucinations, dreams and other misperceptions. In the third part, I argue that such Epicurean perceptual content can be explained by the modern notion of non-conceptual content, which helps us to understand the special feature of Epicurean perceptions and also the important difference between perception and belief in Epicurean epistemology. In the final part, I discuss the notion of alethes which I suggest implies that perception is “factive”.