Pregledni rad
Institutional Design and the European Union's Democratic Deficit
Tihomir CIPEK
Sažetak
Proposals of institutional design are presented in the text in
an attempt to solve the problem of the European Union’s
democratic deficit. The parliamentary, post-parliamentary
and presidentialist strategies are analysed. The
parliamentary strategy emphasises the democratic function of
the national parliaments of the member states in European
decision-making processes. It analyses their attempt to
strengthen their legitimacy function through special
committees for European issues. The post-parliamentary
strategy supports direct coordination of interests between the
European Commission and corporative interest associations.
It is deemed that corporative and lobby networks, although
contributing to efficient decision-making, cannot replace the
role of the parliament. They do not have democratic
legitimacy and are not subject to democratic control.
Presidentialist legitimacy strategies through their proposal of
direct election of the president of the European Commission
on the one hand are moving towards increasing democratic
legitimacy of the Union, but on the other hand are
neglecting the imminent principle of consensus. The
European Parliament remains the only place where there is
an attempt to establish the general interest of the European
Union’s citizens. Thus, in addition to European political
parties, it has a decisive role in establishing democratic
legitimacy. It is concluded that the problem of a deficient
democratic legitimacy of the European Union cannot be
solved without establishing the European public and
politicising the decision-making process.
Ključne riječi
institutional design; European Union; parliament; democratic deficit
Hrčak ID:
19169
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.10.2007.
Posjeta: 3.220 *