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Yugoslav-British Relations and the Comintern 1941-43

Vojmir Kljaković


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 630 Kb

str. 5-15

preuzimanja: 535

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Sažetak

The appearance of armed resistance under the leadership of KPJ (the Yugoslav Communist Party) gave rise to a special problem in relationships between Great Britain and Yugoslavia. Great Britain received the Yugoslav government and the king when in April 1941 they left the country, acting as their protector and stressing the legality of king and government. The Soviet Union had at first broken diplomatic relations but renewed them after the German attack, recognising the Yugoslav government and the king and the legitimate representatives of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government was not only against the Yugoslav Communist Party but against the resistance movement in the country. It did not approve of armed resistance and recognised Draža Mihailović (and his Četniks) as its representative and later as its minister. Mihailović was also against the Partisans and the Communist Party. The narodnooslobodilački pokret (NOP, the People's Liberation Movement) under the leadership of KPJ, was an armed uprising against the occupier and acted as such. It did not recognise the rights of a government and king who had deserted the country and it fought for the reconstitution of Yugoslavia with a more just and progressive internal structure.
These various viewpoints complicated relationships. While Great Britain, as the leading ally, dealt with Yugoslav affairs, the Soviet goverment maintained its relations with the Yugoslav government at the state level. Meanwhile Comintern kept in touch with CK KPJ (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) adapting its approach to the policy of the Soviet government and thus inevitably became increasingly out of step with the activity and aspirations of those leading armed resistance in Yugoslavia.
The leadership of NOP showed at the beginning a great deal of understanding towards the International position of the Soviet Union even when it was not in the interest of NOP. But when, with the passage of time, the inflexible policy of Stalin, accepted also by Comintern, threatened the vital interests of the new Yugoslavia in process of formation, the leadership of NOP decisively withdrew.
In spite of the disapproval and restraint of Comintern, at the end of 1942 the Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije (AVNOJ, the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia) was constituted and the armed forces were re-organised into divisions and corps (NOVJ, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia). Thereupon the leadership of NOP took diplomatic action at an International level irrespective of the opinion and position of the Comintern. Up till April 1943 Tito and the President of AVNOJ issued several statements intended for the Allied Powers concerning the conditions in YugosIavia, and publicized the political program of NOP.
Under the impression of the political and military maturity of NOP and through changes on the Mediterranean, in the first half of 1943 the first encourgaing change took place: the two first British military missions visited higher circles of NOVJ while Comintern and the Soviet government more openly revealed the betrayal of Draža Mihailović. The truth about the situation in Yugoslavia began to penetrate more strongly to the Allied public. Tito then invited Moscow to send its own military mission but this did not take place until the following year. Soon after the arrival of the British military mission at the Hig Command of NOVJ, Comintern was disbanded and the Allies landed in Sicily. These were new factors which were to give the leadership of NOP good foundations for the further successful development of a foreign policy directed towards the foundation of a new Yugoslavia.

Ključne riječi

Hrčak ID:

219023

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/219023

Datum izdavanja:

16.7.1977.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 965 *