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https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838

Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology

Fan Zhang ; School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology No. 122, Luoshi St. Wuhan, 430070, P. R. China
Jianmu Ye ; School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology No. 122, Luoshi St. Wuhan, 430070, P. R. China
Congzhen Xie ; School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology No. 122, Luoshi St. Wuhan, 430070, P. R. China

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (7 MB) str. 1410-1421 preuzimanja: 49* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Zhang, F., Ye, J. i Xie, C. (2019). Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology. Tehnički vjesnik, 26 (5), 1410-1421. https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838
MLA 8th Edition
Zhang, Fan, et al. "Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology." Tehnički vjesnik, vol. 26, br. 5, 2019, str. 1410-1421. https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838. Citirano 15.11.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition
Zhang, Fan, Jianmu Ye i Congzhen Xie. "Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology." Tehnički vjesnik 26, br. 5 (2019): 1410-1421. https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838
Harvard
Zhang, F., Ye, J., i Xie, C. (2019). 'Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology', Tehnički vjesnik, 26(5), str. 1410-1421. https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838
Vancouver
Zhang F, Ye J, Xie C. Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology. Tehnički vjesnik [Internet]. 2019 [pristupljeno 15.11.2019.];26(5):1410-1421. https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838
IEEE
F. Zhang, J. Ye i C. Xie, "Collusion-Proof Mechanism in Compensation for Failed Generic Technological Innovation Projects: Based on Information Topology", Tehnički vjesnik, vol.26, br. 5, str. 1410-1421, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20190726052838

Sažetak
Against the backdrop of innovation fault-tolerance, government compensation for failed generic technological innovation projects is beneficial to stimulate re-innovation behaviour. However, considering the information asymmetry, a collusion tendency exists between the compensated party and the evaluator during the process of compensation. To prompt the government to build collusion-proof mechanisms to reduce collusion loss, the evolutionary game method was used to build replicated dynamic equations and a Jacobian matrix of both sides based on the information topology between the conspirators and regulator. Through the evolutionary equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, evolutionary stability strategies (ESS) under different topological relationship information (non-intersect, partial intersect, and inclusive type) were found. Results show that the collusion behaviour can be effectively restrained when the government is unaware of collusion information, the net defense income is positive, and the penalty threshold is the product of the net collusive income and the ratio of the collusive and regulatory information. With the increasing amount of collusive information available to the government, the conspirators tend to adhere to moral principles subject to strict regulation. In addition, the moderating effect of penalty factor is positively correlated with the private information possessed by both sides. The conclusion is beneficial to provide theoretical support for optimizing the government-led compensation mechanism for failed generic technological innovation projects.

Ključne riječi
collusion-proof mechanism; compensation for failure; evolutionary game; failed generic technological innovation projects; information topology

Hrčak ID: 226038

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/226038

Posjeta: 81 *