APA 6th Edition Keba, A. (2004). The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts. Politička misao, 41 (5), 134-148. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/21150
MLA 8th Edition Keba, Andrej. "The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts." Politička misao, vol. 41, br. 5, 2004, str. 134-148. https://hrcak.srce.hr/21150. Citirano 20.01.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Keba, Andrej. "The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts." Politička misao 41, br. 5 (2004): 134-148. https://hrcak.srce.hr/21150
Harvard Keba, A. (2004). 'The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts', Politička misao, 41(5), str. 134-148. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/21150 (Datum pristupa: 20.01.2020.)
Vancouver Keba A. The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts. Politička misao [Internet]. 2004 [pristupljeno 20.01.2020.];41(5):134-148. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/21150
IEEE A. Keba, "The Concept of Self-Identity and Moral Conflicts", Politička misao, vol.41, br. 5, str. 134-148, 2004. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/21150. [Citirano: 20.01.2020.]
Sažetak This paper examines the concept of self-identity as a factor that influences
agents’ choices in moral conflicts. The main questions it concerns itself with are
whether there is a connection between self-identity and reasoning in moral dilemmas
and, given the strong reasons to believe that such a connection exists,
how we should most properly understand self-identity. I examine some of the
most notable recent contributions on the topic of personal identity, those of Sandel
and Taylor, and find them wanting because of their one-sided interpretation of
identity. I follow Rorty and Wong in arguing for a more heterogeneous concept of
self-identity, which would respect the various diverse sources of personal identification.
After discussing briefly the types and sources of moral conflict, the paper
examines two widely accepted accounts of reasoning in moral dilemmas, the position
of particularist rationality and the quasi-existentialist position. This is done
with reference to the two main issues of interest here, the extent to which these
accounts acknowledge the importance of self-identity for moral conflict reasoning,
and the plausibility of their conceptions of personal identity. The Aristotelian
position of contextual reasoning is deemed unsatisfactory because it does not include
considerations of self-identity among the resources for resolving the hard
choices, and because it suffers from certain conceptual flaws. The quasi-existentialist
approach to reasoning in moral conflicts pays more attention to agents’ selfidentifications.
However, it is found unconvincing because it focuses solely on
one aspect of the agent’s heterogeneous identity, arguing that adopting a holistic
view of one’s life requires choosing in line with the kind of person one wants to
become. Conversely, this paper argues that agents can maintain the feeling that
their choices are connected to one another by consistently choosing in line with
any of their diverse identifications.