APA 6th Edition Benić, K. (2009). Kantov pokušaj rješavanja problema indukcije. Čemu, VIII (16/17), 11-33. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/61474
MLA 8th Edition Benić, Kristian. "Kantov pokušaj rješavanja problema indukcije." Čemu, vol. VIII, no. 16/17, 2009, pp. 11-33. https://hrcak.srce.hr/61474. Accessed 29 Sep. 2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Benić, Kristian. "Kantov pokušaj rješavanja problema indukcije." Čemu VIII, no. 16/17 (2009): 11-33. https://hrcak.srce.hr/61474
Harvard Benić, K. (2009). 'Kantov pokušaj rješavanja problema indukcije', Čemu, VIII(16/17), pp. 11-33. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/61474 (Accessed 29 September 2020)
Vancouver Benić K. Kantov pokušaj rješavanja problema indukcije. Čemu [Internet]. 2009 [cited 2020 September 29];VIII(16/17):11-33. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/61474
IEEE K. Benić, "Kantov pokušaj rješavanja problema indukcije", Čemu, vol.VIII, no. 16/17, pp. 11-33, 2009. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/61474. [Accessed: 29 September 2020]
Abstracts In this paper, the author tries to give justification for assigning the attribute of necessity to particular empirical laws. Namely, Hume’s formulation of inducti¬on problem endangers the attribute of necessity of particular empirical laws because if we perceive them as generalizations from experience then we can no longer state that they necessary apply to the period which is not subject to our experience. Likewise, induction cannot be justified by referring to the experience in which two phenomena occurred constantly joined together. Na¬mely, the experience is the element which is put in question by formulating the induction problem, so any attempt a posteriore of justifying induction is bound to fail because it is circular. Therefore, if we try to offer a valid justification of induction it can be a priori, i.e. we can try justifying induction with elements which do not have their origin in empirical experience. Kant’s way of justi¬fying induction is the example of that kind of justification. Induction is justified within Kant’s conception of science. Kant understands science as a device for classification and explanation of phenomena thus, every scientific theory has primarily explanatory role. That form of science is enabled by a priori notion of systematical unity of nature. This notion justifies reduction of endless num¬ber of particular empirical laws to smaller number of more generic empirical laws. It also justifies the forming of system of empirical laws in which more ge¬neric empirical laws explain more particular empirical laws thus ensuring their attribute of necessity. More generic empirical laws are those which explain larger number of phenomena than more particular empirical laws. Therefore, within explanatory system of empirical laws, particular empirical laws can be considered necessary. A priori notion of systematical unity justifies the forming of system within which particular empirical laws have attribute of necessity and that is the essence of a priori justification of induction.