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Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić

Luca Malatesti   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0001-9911-0637 ; Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka, Sveučilišna avenija 4, 51 000 Rijeka, Croatia

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (343 KB) str. 245-259 preuzimanja: 453* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Malatesti, L. (2013). Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena, 12 (2), 245-259. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950
MLA 8th Edition
Malatesti, Luca. "Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić." Prolegomena, vol. 12, br. 2, 2013, str. 245-259. https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950. Citirano 04.08.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Malatesti, Luca. "Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić." Prolegomena 12, br. 2 (2013): 245-259. https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950
Harvard
Malatesti, L. (2013). 'Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić', Prolegomena, 12(2), str. 245-259. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950 (Datum pristupa: 04.08.2021.)
Vancouver
Malatesti L. Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić. Prolegomena [Internet]. 2013 [pristupljeno 04.08.2021.];12(2):245-259. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950
IEEE
L. Malatesti, "Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić", Prolegomena, vol.12, br. 2, str. 245-259, 2013. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950. [Citirano: 04.08.2021.]

Sažetak
Boran Berčić, in the second volume of his recent book "Filozofija" (2012), offers two responses to David Chalmers’s conceivability or modal argument against physicalism. This latter argument aims at showing that zombies, our physical duplicates who lack consciousness, are metaphysically possible, given that they are conceivable. Berčić’s first response is based on the principle of the uniformity of nature that states that causes of a certain type will always cause effects of the same type. His second response is based on the assumption that the basic statements of physicalism in philosophy of mind are or should be contingently true. I argue that if Berčić’s first defence is aimed at the conceivability of zombies, it is unsatisfactory. Moreover, I argue that a quite similar argument, offered by John Perry in his book "Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness" (2001), is afflicted by a similar problem. Nevertheless, under a more plausible interpretation, Berčić’s argument might be taken to attack the metaphysical possibility of zombies. This version of the argument might be effective and has the merit to point out a so far overlooked link between the discussion of the Chalmers’s conceivability arguments against physicalism and the modal strength of causal links and natural laws. Then, I argue that Berčić’s second defence of physicalism, which cannot be combined consistently with his first one, in any case, should not be formulated in the terms of contingent physicalism.

Ključne riječi
A posteriori contingent physicalism; Chalmers’s conceivability argument; physicalism; qualia; uniformity of nature; zombies

Hrčak ID: 111950

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/111950

Posjeta: 805 *