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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 9 No. 2, 2013.

Izvorni znanstveni članak

An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism

Jason Megill ; Carroll College

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 208 Kb

str. 5-17

preuzimanja: 693

citiraj

Sažetak

I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument
shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable.
Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only
have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily.
I address possible objections and then conclude by considering
some implications the argument has for dualism.

Ključne riječi

Epiphenomenalism; Dualism; Mind-Body Problem; Supervenience

Hrčak ID:

125796

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/125796

Datum izdavanja:

10.7.2014.

Posjeta: 1.515 *