Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.7906/indecs.15.4.2
Belief without Representation
Florian Klauser
; University of Ljubljana – Faculty of Education, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Sažetak
In this article, I set off to explore the question “What is belief?” from a first-person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition – starting with Edmund Husserl’s concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus’ explanation of learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus’ own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential direction towards an answer to the question at hand.
Ključne riječi
belief; representation; phenomenology; enaction
Hrčak ID:
191613
URI
Datum izdavanja:
28.12.2017.
Posjeta: 984 *