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Saying without Knowing What or How

Elmar Unnsteinsson orcid id ; University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland/University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 199 Kb

str. 351-382

preuzimanja: 423



In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer’s so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy of language and mind.

Ključne riječi

Implicit reference; propositional attitudes; omissions; intentionalism; transparency; phonology

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