Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.13.2.2
Explanation and Individual Essence
Márta Ujvári
; Corvinus University of Budapest
Sažetak
In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered.
Ključne riječi
qualitative individual essence; bundle theory; Identity of Indiscernibles; Aristotelian essentialism; ontic explanation; explanatory-gap argument
Hrčak ID:
203339
URI
Datum izdavanja:
9.7.2018.
Posjeta: 1.508 *