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European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 14 No. 2, 2018.

Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2

Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?

Sahar Joakim ; Saint Louis University
C. P. Ragland ; Saint Louis University

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (424 KB) str. 11-25 preuzimanja: 25* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Joakim, S. i Ragland, C.P. (2018). Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 14 (2), 11-25. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2
MLA 8th Edition
Joakim, Sahar i C. P. Ragland. "Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 14, br. 2, 2018, str. 11-25. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2. Citirano 22.03.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition
Joakim, Sahar i C. P. Ragland. "Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14, br. 2 (2018): 11-25. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2
Harvard
Joakim, S., i Ragland, C.P. (2018). 'Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 14(2), str. 11-25. doi: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2
Vancouver
Joakim S, Ragland CP. Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2018 [pristupljeno 22.03.2019.];14(2):11-25. doi: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2
IEEE
S. Joakim i C.P. Ragland, "Is Hobbes Really an Antirealist about Accidents?", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.14, br. 2, str. 11-25, 2018. [Online]. doi: https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.14.2.2

Sažetak
In Metaphysical Themes, Robert Pasnau interprets Thomas Hobbes as an anti-realist about all accidents in general. In opposition to Pasnau, we argue that Hobbes is a realist about some accidents (e.g., motion and magnitude). Section One presents Pasnau’s position on Hobbes; namely, that Hobbes is an unqualified anti-realist of the eliminativist sort. Section Two offers reasons to reject Pasnau’s interpretation. Hobbes explains that magnitude is mind-independent, and he offers an account of perception in terms of motion (understood as a mind-independent feature of body). Therefore, it seems incorrect to call Hobbes an anti-realist about all accidents. Section Three considers Pasnau’s hypothetical response: he might claim that for Hobbes, motion reduces to body and does not exist in its own right. Section Four notes that reductionism about all accidents does not entail anti-realism about all accidents. Even granting Pasnau’s anticipated response, his anti-realist reading does not follow. Contra Pasnau, Hobbes is best understood as claiming that motion and magnitude exist mind-independently.

Ključne riječi
Hobbes; Pasnau; antirealism about accidents; body; motion

Hrčak ID: 212788

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/212788

Posjeta: 56 *