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https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1

Quine's Poor Tom

Tristan Grøtvedt Haze ; The University of Sydney

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (259 KB) str. 5-16 preuzimanja: 109* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Haze, T.G. (2019). Quine's Poor Tom. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15 (1), 5-16. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
MLA 8th Edition
Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt. "Quine's Poor Tom." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 15, br. 1, 2019, str. 5-16. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1. Citirano 12.11.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition
Haze, Tristan Grøtvedt. "Quine's Poor Tom." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15, br. 1 (2019): 5-16. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
Harvard
Haze, T.G. (2019). 'Quine's Poor Tom', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15(1), str. 5-16. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
Vancouver
Haze TG. Quine's Poor Tom. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2019 [pristupljeno 12.11.2019.];15(1):5-16. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1
IEEE
T.G. Haze, "Quine's Poor Tom", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.15, br. 1, str. 5-16, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1

Sažetak
Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.

Ključne riječi
belief contexts; referential transparency; opacity; Quine; perspicuity

Hrčak ID: 217351

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/217351

Posjeta: 221 *