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Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1

To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will

Nadine Elzein   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0003-0312-2233 ; University of Oxford
Tuomas K. Pernu   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0002-6668-6127 ; University of Helsinki and King’s College London

Fulltext: english, pdf (393 KB) pages 13-32 downloads: 29* cite
APA 6th Edition
Elzein, N. & Pernu, T.K. (2019). To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15 (2), 13-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1
MLA 8th Edition
Elzein, Nadine and Tuomas K. Pernu. "To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 2, 2019, pp. 13-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1. Accessed 22 Jan. 2020.
Chicago 17th Edition
Elzein, Nadine and Tuomas K. Pernu. "To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15, no. 2 (2019): 13-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1
Harvard
Elzein, N., and Pernu, T.K. (2019). 'To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15(2), pp. 13-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1
Vancouver
Elzein N, Pernu TK. To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2019 [cited 2020 January 22];15(2):13-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1
IEEE
N. Elzein and T.K. Pernu, "To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.15, no. 2, pp. 13-32, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.1

Abstracts
A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

Keywords
Determinism; epistemic deontologism; free will; libertarianism; normativity; ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’; ‘ought’ implies ‘can’; PAP; practical deontologism; reasons; responsibility; transcendental arguments

Hrčak ID: 229961

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/229961

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