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https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.22.1.1

Logic Oughtn’t be Normative

Christopher J. Searle orcid id orcid.org/0000-0001-9222-1254 ; Sveučilište Oxford


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 121 Kb

str. 3-10

preuzimanja: 371

citiraj


Sažetak

Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logi- cally is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour of the normative status of logic involves the assumption that the issue is substantive. I draw a distinction between deontic and axiological normativity as applied to logical theory and demonstrate that because deontic sentences are not truth–functional, logic cannot be normative in the deontic sense. I conclude that the only sense in which logical theory may be thought of as normative is axiologically.

Ključne riječi

logic; logical normativity; normative logic; logical theory; deontology; axiologic

Hrčak ID:

250670

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/250670

Datum izdavanja:

24.1.2021.

Posjeta: 906 *