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Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason

Elvio Baccarini orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-6771-9859 ; Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Rijeka, Hrvatska


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 111 Kb

str. 199-214

preuzimanja: 115

citiraj


Sažetak

Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express demands. I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.

Ključne riječi

Epistemic injustice; Miranda Fricker; public reason; John Rawls.

Hrčak ID:

253654

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/253654

Datum izdavanja:

14.7.2020.

Posjeta: 454 *