Izvorni znanstveni članak

https://doi.org/10.17535/crorr.2021.0014

Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma among mobile agents performing 2D random walk

Jurica Hižak orcid.org/0000-0002-8394-5581 ; University North, University Center Varaždin, Croatia

Sažetak

When Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma takes place on a two-dimensional plane among mobile agents, the course of the game slightly differs from that one in a well-mixed population. In this paper we present a detailed derivation of the expected number of encounters required for Tit-for-tat strategy to get even with Always-Defect strategy in a Brownian-like population. It will be shown that in such an environment Tit-for-Tat can perform better than in a well-mixed population.

Ključne riječi

game theory; payoff; prisoner's dilemma; random walk; tit-for-tat

Hrčak ID:

267806

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/267806

Datum izdavanja:

23.12.2021.

Posjeta: 1.023 *