Izvorni znanstveni članak
Gnostic Disagreement Norms
; LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon
Puni tekst: engleski pdf 273 Kb
APA 6th Edition
Faria, D. (2022). Gnostic Disagreement Norms. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 18 (1), A2-22. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.2
MLA 8th Edition
Faria, Domingos. "Gnostic Disagreement Norms." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 18, br. 1, 2022, str. A2-22. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.2. Citirano 01.06.2023.
Chicago 17th Edition
Faria, Domingos. "Gnostic Disagreement Norms." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18, br. 1 (2022): A2-22. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.2
Faria, D. (2022). 'Gnostic Disagreement Norms', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 18(1), str. A2-22. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.2
Faria D. Gnostic Disagreement Norms. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2022 [pristupljeno 01.06.2023.];18(1). https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.2
D. Faria, "Gnostic Disagreement Norms", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.18, br. 1, str. A2-22, 2022. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.18.1.2
Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement.
disagreement, evaluative norms, prescriptive norms, disagreement norms, gnostic disagreement norms, knowledge-first epistemology
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