Uvodnik
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1805345
Shareholding structure, private benefit of control and incentive intensity: from the perspective of enterprise strategic behaviour
Kai Zhao
Hua-Hua Huang
Wan-Shu Wu
Sažetak
This paper studies theoretically and empirically the relationship
among shareholding structure, the private benefit of control and
incentive intensity. By integrating the principal–agent theory and
the market competition theory into the three-stage dynamic
game model, we built the dual principal–agent relationship
including both ‘shareholder-manager’ and ‘controlling shareholders-small and medium shareholders’. Empirically, the panel data
of 1971 listed enterprises in China from the year 2007 to 2014 are
analysed in order to justify the theoretical results by using twoway fixed effect model, dynamic panel model, and threshold
regression model. It is shown that for enterprise managers, the
higher their ability level and risk aversion, the stronger their
incentive intensity will be. However, for shareholders, the private
benefit of control and the incentive intensity show a non-linear
relationship with the change of ownership concentration.
Ključne riječi
Private benefit of control; principal–agent; shareholding structure; incentive intensity
Hrčak ID:
301193
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.12.2021.
Posjeta: 460 *