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https://doi.org/10.56550/d.2.1.3

The Affects of Pleasure and Displeasure in Plato’s Philebus Regarding Spinoza

Ivana Renić orcid id orcid.org/0009-0006-1557-9344 ; Sveučilište u Zadru


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 267 Kb

str. 63-77

preuzimanja: 86

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Sažetak

The aim of this research is to show how, from his dialogue Philebus, Plato’s understanding of pleasure and displeasure is connected with Spinoza’s theory of affects. Both thinkers understand that the affect of pleasure is related to value judgments and the character of a person. I argue that Plato and Spinoza equally state that there is a difference in individuals’ choices of pleasurable objects, depending on the definition and determination of the good and the ideal of individuals, and thus also depending on the cause of pleasure. Both philosophers agree that the pleasure of a reasonable, wise person is different from the pleasure of an unreasonable one, since their judgment of good and bad is different too. I conclude that Plato’s and Spinoza’s image of a reasonable person coincide in the context of the affects of pleasure and displeasure because it is a holistic image of a person who experiences affects only in accordance with his nature or essence.

Ključne riječi

pleasure; displeasure; judgment; opinion; theory of affects; Plato; Spinoza; cause; nature

Hrčak ID:

311503

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/311503

Datum izdavanja:

26.11.2023.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: njemački

Posjeta: 598 *