Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.24.71.6
Propositions, Concepts, and the Fregean/Russellian Distinction
Dušan Dožudić
orcid.org/0000-0001-7322-402X
; Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
Sažetak
In this paper, I deal with recognising an appropriate criterion for distinguishing two competing conceptions of the propositional content among the content realists—the Fregean and the Russellian—especially in connection to some classical proponents of the realist view (Frege, Moore, and Russell). My starting point is a survey characterisation of the two conceptions and the accompanying classification of Russell’s and Moore’s conceptions of the propositional content, which I find problematic on several accounts. I set up a context for my consideration and elaborate on why I find it problematic. My central point is that, given how the classical proponents of propositions understood their respective conceptions, as well as how more recent proponents of propositions (for example, David Kaplan) understood them, one should draw the distinction between the Fregean and the Russellian conception on the grounds of what propositional components do rather than the nature of propositional components (unless, of course, one ultimately reduces the latter to the former).
Ključne riječi
Concepts; Frege Gottlob; Fregean; Moore Georg E.; propositions; Russell Bertrand; Russellian.
Hrčak ID:
319990
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.8.2024.
Posjeta: 327 *