Izvorni znanstveni članak

https://doi.org/doi: https://doi.org/10.26362/20240202

Gettier’s Case I and the Inseparability Argument

John Ian K. Boongaling orcid.org/0000-0002-8852-2377 ; Department of Philosophy, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman

Sažetak

In this paper, I offer a definition of epistemic justification and a pseudocode algorithm for determining the justification status of an epistemic agent’s belief. By applying the proposed definition and the pseudocode algorithm to Gettier’s Case I, another possibility emerges: the epistemic agent is not justified in believing that
p. At the heart of the argumentative strategy that this paper employs is the idea that S’s belief that p and S’s evidential basis, e, for believing that p are inseparable from each other. As a consequence, S’s belief that p cannot correctly be assessed on its own but only in conjunction with S’s evidential basis e for believing that p.

Ključne riječi

actual belief; epistemic justification; evidence; Gettier Problem; inseparability argument; pseudocode algorithm

Hrčak ID:

323129

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/323129

Datum izdavanja:

7.12.2024.

Posjeta: 370 *