SAUDI ARABIA'S STRATEGIC USE OF SPORT IN THE FORGING OF A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY

2.1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SPORTS

Andrei S. Markovits and Lars Rensmann21 examined the convergence between international sport and the forces of globalization in their work, which has fundamentally transformed both. These authors take up Roland Robertson’s concept of “glocalization,”, which treats globalization not as a ubiquitous and homogenising force, but as one that merges with the “local” in a symbiotic process.22 In essence, the phenomenon of “glocalization” refers to the complex interactions between the global and the local, where each borrows elements from the other.23

Stuart Murray24 developed the concept of “sports diplomacy,” while other authors have systematised and deepened the conceptual richness of this variant of public diplomacy.25 It refers to the conscious and strategic use of sport, athletes, and sporting events by both state and non-state actors to engage with international audiences, exerting influence over its perceptions in order to configure a favourable image that supports the national interest.26

Authors like Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop have been not only important theoretical support, but also an inspiration for the present investigation. Both have built their work upon the concept of “the geopolitical economy of sport,” which refers to “the ways in which nations, states, and other entities engage in, with or through sport for geographic, political, and/or economic reasons in order to build and exert power, and secure strategic advantages through the control of resources within and via networks of which sport is a constituent part."27

3.1. THE SAUDI SOCIAL CONTRACT

States legitimise their authority, beyond coercion, through implicit consent to, or at least a basic acceptance of, its authority.”40 The concept of the “social contract” can be understood as a theoretical-political resource which encapsulates the institutional mechanisms to conciliate the tension between individual interest and social results, between the state and its subjects.41 The achieved balance is expressed through a particular distribution of rights and obligations between the government and the citizens that legitimizes the rule of the former.

In Saudi Arabia, this balance is constituted by a series of informal covenants between the Government and the royal family, the commercial elites, the clergy and the rest of the population that distribute rights and duties. Traditionally, the ulema have been responsible for affairs concerning religion, society, education and the law, whereas the Al-Saud family has been in charge of political, economic and military leadership as well as international representation.42

The legitimacy of the Kingdom and its royalty is supported by the pact established between the Al-Saud and Al-Wahhab families in 1744. Wherever the Al-Saud governed, the proselytism of Wahhabism43 would be imposed and those who adopted these beliefs as their own, would support the monarchy.44 The alliance, in addition with extensive use of force, was useful in expanding the territories under the central State; to homogenise the population fragmented by the divisive tribal socio-political system dwelling in them; and to undermine the nomadic nature of Bedouin tribes towards the third foundation of the Saudi state in 1932.45

This pact remains one of the foundations of political legitimacy. The use of Islam for legitimation has worked through the institutionalization of religious authorities with wide functions and the State’s diffusion of the Wahhabi narrative, which depicts it as the embodiment of the nation. The alliance with the ulema has ensured that the State’s actions are sanctioned positively by the religious establishment. This support has proven vital when introducing innovations.46

Furthermore, the clergy in Saudi Arabia has preached obedience to the State as a core value of Islamic society, infusing Saudi national identity with loyalty to the Al-Saud family as an element. Wahhabism has served as an overarching and supra-tribal identity that placated differences and legitimized the Al-Saud rule.47 This narrative has constituted the basis of Saudi “customs,” which serve as the social motor that gives any change the sanction of precedent, social continuity, and natural law.48 The custom dominates in so-called traditional societies.49

The position held by the clergy is not solely derived from their religious prestige, but also from their appointment as civil servants by the King.50 This relationship, as a by-product of modernization of the State, has adopted a tendency of Islam becoming more statist in order for the ulema to preserve their power.51 The transition to a unified and modern nation-state demanded adjustments that diminished the ulema's role in society. Nonetheless, periods of intense instability, such as the 1979 seizure of Mecca, required the reinforcement of religious power.52 The achievement of a balance has been subject to thorough revisions through time in order to preserve Islam as a source of legitimacy for the Al-Saud family.

The gradual diminishment of the clergy’s ability to supervise the implementation of shari’a led to the emergence of zealous Muslims, whose identity had been moulded by those same ulema’s religious discourse. They have occasionally questioned the religious authority of the State and even turned into bastions of Islamic fundamentalism opposing modernization campaigns.53 The Royal family's efforts to cultivate Wahhabism as a state religion and as an essential national attribute had a by-product: the rise of fundamentalist groups both within and outside the Saudi establishment.

In this context, relying solely on religion as the basis of the State was insufficient to assure legitimacy. With the windfalls from oil, the Saudi government has pursued national integration through the creation of a community of economic and social interests that sublimate inbred local loyalties and prejudice into a national sentiment.54 The relationship between citizens and the State has been shaped by the Saudi ruling establishment's ability to disburse oil revenues. The Government is a net provider of economic benefits55 offering public employment opportunities, taxes exemptions, and subsidised services like water, energy, etc.56

3.2. THE SAUDI NATION

Montagu affirms that “in creating a country, King Abdulaziz could not forge a nation.”57 However, the creation of a unified nation-state was a conscious effort of the first Saudi king that was prolonged by his sons.58 Identity is a plural and multidimensional process subject to change.59 Collective identities of Muslim Arabs in the Middle East usually incorporate Islamic, Arab, regional and national elements.60

Saudi society is organized around a complex system of overlapping loyalties that include religious, tribal, ethnic and national allegiances, among others.61 In the opinion of the younger population, the most important elements when describing their identities are religion and family, both ranking higher than the nation.62 Social diversity transforms the national identity into something problematic.63

In order to sublimate this social fragmentation into a national identity, a discourse that articulates the diverse components of the latter into one particular and differentiable entity is needed. Saudi Arabia’s national identity is infused with Islamic symbols and greatly traversed by Arab legacy, subordinating it to greater fellowships.64 The ubiquity of Islam and Arab heritage pushes the nation, particularly within the Muslim umma, beyond the State’s boundaries,65 turning the distinction of peculiarities into a difficult task. The Saudi state preceded a national identity that was moulded to suit the Al-Saud’s political needs.66

The distinct component that turns the Saudi imagined community into limited is an idealized past built on two myths:

Both elements were identified as early as the 1920s in order to give rise to a cohesive national identity. The first has already been discussed, exemplified by the allegiance between the Al-Saud and the Al-Wahhab families. Cultivating a national identity anchored in religion and, thus, loyalty to the House of Saud was essential to counter opposition groups outside and inside the Islamic establishment.68

The second one endows the State with the patriarchal obligations of the tribal shaykh of mediating disputes, defending its people, and dispensing largesse69 to dismantle previous tribal loyalties. The most important function, the economic one, can be observed in the rentist nature of the State. Citizenship equals admission to the tribe and, thus, an entitlement to the distribution of external rent, creating another incentive for inhabitants of Saudi Arabia to buy into the myth of Saudi national identity.

The Saudi nation had to be built through the invention of traditions. Practices founded on religion, such as segregation between sexes or male guardianship, and a supra-tribal identity, through economic incentives like public employment and tax exemptions, have become ritualized via public efforts in order to inculcate a national sentiment. The instrumentalization of factors that generate identification throughout society has been intended to create a horizontal link for an idealized homogenous entity, ergo, the Saudi nation. This reality has been incarnated by the state—and by antonomasia, the Al-Saud family—turning it into the sacralization of the nation and a legitimate sovereign.

Elements that symbolize the Saudi nation, such as the national flag, anthem, postage stamps and holidays, while signs of the separateness of the State, are rooted in Islamic imagery. Even if useful to promote the collectiveness of the nation, they were primarily designed to emphasize the country’s association with Islam rather than its narrow national character.70 The promotion of religion as part of Saudi national values is a response to the perceived threat of Western influences that might menace the State’s authority and legitimacy. This resistance to the incorporation of exogenous cultural elements creates a sense of holistic immobilism that has been challenging to uphold at times.

The emergence of national ideologies was contested by the religious establishment and blocked by the State since it could have threatened their existence.71 The concept of nationalism is regarded as a secular term and, thus, antithetical to adherence to Islam.72 Secularism and nationalism could have also introduced the idea of political representation.73 In addition, these types of discourses in the Middle East are more commonly articulated in terms of Arab nationalism, an idea that transcends national boundaries.74

Traditional roles for women have become a symbol of Wahhabi heritage and are exploited by the State to emphasize the Islamic character of its national identity.75 Any intention to alter this unique state of affairs represented a challenge to the stability and legitimacy of the monarchy, as it could spark outrage within both the religious establishment and the citizenry.

Wahhabism imposes strict exegesis on women's role in society, creating an “ideal Islamic woman,”76 that has deeply intertwined with Saudi culture, despite having little foundation on the sacred texts of Islam.77 This ideology has been reinforced by the State’s continuous re-inscription of it into society through policy decisions and government statements.78 Controlling women’s mobility and confining them to the household domain has meant that the nation's existence as an homogenous Islamic community has been moulded essentially by men.79 Even later efforts to broaden women’s role in society have not led to integration with men, but rather to small segregated spaces meant for women alone where they have minimal agency.80

Segregation between sexes, in itself a way of making Islam noticeable, has turned into the most visible flagship of Islamic morality and has merged with the concept of gender in Saudi Arabia. The “ideal Islamic woman” ideology has been inculcated through the feminine education system. With control of the educational sphere, the ulemas have had a rigid control over knowledge. The collective identity promulgated reflects the idea of a Saudi entity, but has always been predominantly Islamic.81

3.3. THE HEART OF THE ARAB AND THE MUSLIM WORLDS

Islam is the most important factor affecting the stipulation of priorities of foreign policy.82 The King bears the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, referring to Mecca and Medina, which has granted him significant regional gravitation. The Saudi Arabian Arab and Islamic cultural heritage is an important source of soft power.83 In accordance, Saudi Arabia has presented itself as a hegemonic power in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The communion between the religious and political power legitimates Saudi Arabian foreign policy within the regional and Muslim spheres.

The Kingdom identifies itself as the natural leader of the Middle East, the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds and the sentinel of their heritage. It has assumed the role of regional guide and mediator.84 Regional hegemony has been the most suitable way to assure that external events do not threaten internal political power.85 As a way to preserve internal cohesion, prevent external interference or ideological influence and expand its hegemony, Saudi Arabia has adopted a parishioner identity—particularly after the Iranian Revolution and the Grand Mosque seizure in 1979.

The extrapolation of religious and sectarian rhetoric has been useful to counter alternative models of leadership in the region, namely in the present century the Islamic Republic of Iran. The two countries have perceived each other as sectarian (Sunnis versus Shiites), ethnic (Arabs versus Persians), ideological (United States allies versus enemies), and geopolitical rivals,86 as they strive to position themselves as the representatives of the Middle East and Islam in the International System.

To maintain its religious authority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia could not stray away from internal conservative measures.87 Thus, this customary nature of the Saudi national identity is deeply intertwined with its perceived international image. The growing preoccupation of Western countries to enforce globally the human rights agenda has further strained the already withered relation with the stagnant Saudi monarchy.88

THE BOND WITH THE WEST

Identity is not immutable nor does it exist in a void. It corresponds to a socio-historic category determined in relation to others. The identification of an actor as a threat or an ally is socially and historically constructed.89 Narratives that describe “the East” as a passive object for study and conquest by “the West” are not uncommon.

Saudi Arabia's identity in the International System is erected over certain knowledge structures forged through multiple interactions and complex intercultural articulation between the Arab and Islamic spheres and those foreign to them. Following a political-ideological criterion, the Kingdom has been situated under the homogenising category of “Orient.” This concept submerges the identitarian differences of Asian realities in a monolithic fantasy that moulds the imaginary and creates knowledge.90 Prejudices are not innate, but learnt beliefs acquired through socialization.

The West/East dichotomy and the identification of countries in the Middle East have been moulded by certain narratives. Roles exist in relation to others because they do not respond to individual characteristics of actors, but are positions within a structure based on intersubjective construction of meaning.91 The concept of the “West” is built upon the cooperative conduct of North Atlantic states following the Second World War that gave rise to an amity that goes beyond a mere alliance because they identify each other’s securitarian needs as their own.92 This results in the development of a collective security system between homogenous93 states who share a common fate and expectations of permanence, as crystallised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.94

The interactions between this sphere and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been guided by the ambition of preserving stability for the global energy and arms commerce to function smoothly. On the basis of their exchanges, both actors gave rise to economic and military interests. Saudi Arabia had turned, after the cornerstone of the bond was set by the accord between Abdulaziz bin Saud and Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, into an important ally. The tie-in was erected over a geostrategic interest of the United States in consolidating a state that could play the role of a regional hegemon responsible for preserving peace,95 an identity that was assumed and reproduced by the Kingdom. This attitude was testimony of a shared perception of a common fate anchored in a communion of geopolitical interests: eliminating possible threats to peace in the Middle East, protecting commerce fluxes, and repelling the advance of socialist influence in the Arab sphere.96

Saudi Arabia’s position in the region, in security terms, was conservative. Once the Cold War period ended, the common fate perception mutated towards countering destabilizing actors such as Iraq, Iran, and transnational terrorism. The persistence of these master variables97 originated the permissive condition for the generation of a collective identity: self-restraint. A cooperative security system emerged from what was once a purely transactional bond. However, Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West have always shown lack of homogeneity, hindering the deepening of interdependence. The alliance has been an only instrumental strategy destined to enhance individual benefits, without the emergence of a collective identity.

In the eyes of the Al-Saud family, this relationship was of vital importance to preserve national security.98 However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the economic and geopolitical interests that supported the bond have been fading. The United States and Europe have attained more energy independence from Saudi Arabia through the boost of internal capacities and trade with new partners99 amidst a steep drop in oil prices that has endangered Saudi finances.100

The decline in the contribution of external rent to national development has impacted strongly over the Kingdom. The Government faced budget deficits that needed to be mitigated with fiscal reserves, reductions in public salaries and subsidies and the imposition of new taxes.101 Although the austerity measures were lifted in 2017 when oil prices began to rise, this cyclical pattern exposed the State to the population's discontent. Saudi Arabia not only had to deal with the financial cost of this process but also with the political one, deriving from the threat to internal stability and the viability of the social contract.102

The security dimension of the relationship has not improved. Since the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center towers, the fight against transnational terrorism has turned central to Saudi-West relations due to Western pressure on Saudi leadership.103 The onslaught on American soil created the necessary conditions for the imposition of two guidelines destined to ideologically mould the region: Iraq's invasion in 2003 and a resurgence of the exceptionalistic nationalism based on democratic values that shall be emulated by the Middle Eastern nations.104 The American unilateral offensive in Iraqi territory without previous consultation with then King Abdullah, as a punishment for the participation of Saudi nationals in 9/11 attack and suspicions of ties between the Saudi government and extremist cells,105 dismissed Saudi regional authority and triggered a power vacuum in which Iranian influence grew stronger.106

Saudi Arabia’s international image was severely affected by these developments. Since the end of the previous millennium, interactions with the West have been marked by Western criticism of human rights abuses, lack of fundamental liberties, and absence of democratic rights.107 Until this moment they had been managed in economic terms fundamentally.108. However, with the emergence of the “human security” paradigm, in which human rights lie at the core,109 the bond between the parties could no longer be justified in the same terms as before.

This new securitarian approach goes beyond the previously perceived dichotomy between national interest and human rights in order to guarantee human dignity. Shortcomings in a state’s domestic human rights policy could be viewed as an indicator of international aggression by other actors.110 As a result, Saudi Arabia has often been depicted in the West as a conservative and repressive actor.111 The media have focused their attention on events of crisis, terrorism and fanaticism, contributing to a biased perspective that reflects the persistence of the myth of a clash between civilizations and Islamophobic prejudices.112 The coverage that Saudi Arabia receives is focused on human rights abuses and its conservative stance, promoting the automatic association of Islam with religious extremism.113

Due to its traditional role as a peacekeeper in the Middle East and its stance on human, political, and women’s rights, the West has projected onto the Kingdom a role of “conservative” state. Such identity was assumed and reproduced by the monarchy because the legitimacy of its rulers is fundamentally attached to regional dynamics, as well as significant soft power emanating from its religious proselytism.

As the Arab Spring uprisings would once again showcase, disruptive regional elements that challenge religious and political legitimacy are seen as a threat to domestic equilibrium.114 The protests in 2011 deepened the divide with Western countries. Saudi leadership was frightened of losing control.115

Saudi Arabia intended to preserve the status quo in the regional scope. In Bahrain, the Saudi forces intervened to protect the al-Khalifa regime within the Gulf Cooperation Council framework. The downfall of this Government could not only end up in the rise of a hostile leadership under Iranian influence,116 but also encourage Shiite protests in Saudi territory.117 Washington was not keen on creating new hotbeds of conflict while trying to exit Afghanistan and Iraq, so its role in the Arab Spring was not active. The American absence of determination in dealing with Mubarak's downfall in Egypt in 2011 and the Syrian civil war disappointed Saudi leaders as it signified a growth of Shiite power.118

Uncertainty gave way to an arms race in the Middle East and challenges to Saudi hegemony. States like Qatar tried to distance themselves from the dispute, avoiding sticking to Riyadh or Teheran agendas instead imposing their own. Doha has attempted to establish itself as the hegemon in the Sunni bloc and the interlocutor of Western countries in mediation matters, distancing itself from the parishioner Saudi foreign policy.119 The growing tension winded up in a diplomatic crisis manifested in a blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Allegedly, the reason was Qatari financing of terrorist cells, but it was also related to the rapprochement of Qatar with Turkey and Iran, as well as divergences on the political situations in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen.120

Simultaneously, the Obama administration opened a dialogue channel with Iran because it was now seen as a key actor in restoring stability in Iraq and Afghanistan.121 Western detente with an enemy plunged the Kingdom into an identity crisis that was compensated for through aggression and self-affirmation.122 The exclusion of Saudi Arabia's opinion in the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was seen by the Saudi royal family as supporting Shiite interests and disregarding its role as an interlocutor.123

The imposition of Saudi hegemony was not possible in a context characterized by the rupture of the Sunni bloc124 and the emergence of wayward actors afraid to become vassals. The incapacity of the Al-Saud family to preserve peace in the neighborhood undermined their relationships with Western countries, which are crucial to Saudi foreign and security policies.

4.1. THE RISE OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN

In 2015, with the ascension of King Salman to the throne, the armed forces turned into a deterrent element in service of regional policy objectives. Mohammed bin Salman, who was in charge of the Ministry of Defence, decided to lead an intervention in Yemen with the Emirati's support, Egypt's absence, and the Western countries' hesitation. During a time of geopolitical confrontation with Iran, war in Yemen and skepticism about the reliability of Western states as security partners, the Saudi leadership found a solution to guarantee the royal family legitimacy through a nationalistic narrative based on a Saudi, Arabic and Islamic identity.125

The Houthis, a political and military group whose majority members profess the Zaydi variant of Shia Islam, were rapidly gaining territory with the intention of overthrowing the central Government. Operation Decisive Storm was not based on a political coincidence or legalism, but on a fear of Shiite influence extending into Saudi Arabia's perceived zone of influence.126

The use of this “danger discourse” has been twofold. In the first place, to boost internal unity against an external enemy. In the second place, to fulfill the Al-Saud perception that the discursive construction of Iranian interference in regional conflicts is necessary to validate its role as an essential interlocutor and a security partner of the West.127 However, the United States restricted their military action to the fighting of extremist jihadism and did not engage in the conflict with the Houthis. The operation continued but the desired outcome was never achieved. On the contrary, the sectarian narrative only strengthened the bond between the Houthis and Iran.

Moreover, the coalition led by the Kingdom has shown little regard for the human rights of Yemeni civilians, creating an unprecedented humanitarian crisis denounced by international media, Western citizens, the European Parliament, the American Congress and the United Nations.128 The crisis worsened in 2018 with the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi dissident journalist, at the Saudi Arabia's embassy in Turkey. The UN's Human Rights Council held the Kingdom responsible, with several individuals accused of participating in the murder plot, including Mohammed bin Salman who had been the heir to the throne since 2017.

Western defense and security cooperation has been affected. The European Parliament proposed a halt in arms transfers to the Kingdom, which was abided by Germany, Finland and Denmark. In addition, the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom all imposed sanctions on Saudi citizens and severely reduced cooperation with the Al-Saud family.129 The country’s media representation in the West has deteriorated as a result of the UN determining the country’s direct responsibility in the assassination of Khashoggi130 and denouncing Yemen's humanitarian crisis.131 Many companies and entrepreneurs decided not to attend “Davos in the Desert,” an economic and financial conference organized by the Crown Prince to advance the Vision 2030 agenda.132

The content of the Saudi “conservative” role mutated in absence of its securitarian basis. When the narrative gets devoid of egoist interests that justify a relationship with a heterogeneous actor, it becomes more susceptible to normative discourse.133 If Saudi Arabia does not serve Western interests, it loses relevance in their securitarian apparatus. By 2018, the relationship not only brought limited benefits but also carried high reputational costs. Citizens of Western countries criticized the provision of arms to a Saudi Kingdom134 that never met its expectations for social, religious and political reform. In this context, the logical basis for the bond no longer seemed obvious or, at least, easily justifiable.135

SAUDI VISION 2030

Mohammed bin Salman has been the representative of a generational change in the State and the main artificer of the most recent Saudi national development plan: Saudi Vision 2030. This blueprint has become a symbol of the Prince's domestic ambitions and his efforts to address young people's concerns.136 He understood that failing to diversify Saudi Arabia's economy, enact profound societal changes, and modify the country’s international platform would lead to the end of the Saudi model.137 The Crown Prince has expressed his dissatisfaction with the course Saudi Arabia has taken since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and is unwilling to risk the country’s future combating extremist ideologies that have questioned the State’s authority and diminished the Kingdom's stance on the international stage.138

Announced in 2016, Saudi Vision 2030 could be more accurately described as a roadmap than a detailed strategy since it states objectives and public compromises, but it is not clear how these shall be met. The main mission remains the same as enunciated in previous plans: to diversify the national economy, reduce dependence on public spending, and create new job opportunities. Nonetheless, it also aims to achieve a more dynamic and independent private sector, eliminate fiscal deficits, focus on efficiency in public structures and open the social sphere, among other goals.139

Saudi Vision 2030 is not a homogenization with Western models of nation-states, nor is it a holistic modernization effort. It can be more accurately described as a hybridization process in which Saudi Arabia's identity internalizes exogenous factors perceived as compatible with the existing power structure in order to preserve political stability and royal legitimacy.

A common misconception is viewing traditionalist and modernist forces as opposing each other, whereas they often function in a symbiotic way. Strengthening traditional social structures has typically been a necessary prelude for the introduction of economic modernization measures, just as social reforms have had on multiple occasions the intention of validating political power.140 The lens should always address how these forces complement each other to assure the viability of the Saudi regime.141

THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE

Sports diplomacy is a vehicle for the communication of identities, values, and narratives and, thus, a tool to conquer people's minds and hearts. Political exploitation of sports and global sporting events is not novel, but its manifestations have grown in recent times. Emergent states have taken a growing interest in them as a way to promote a national ideology, showcase internal reforms globally, alter their international image, further legitimise their governments, and leverage their position in the International System.185 The strategic use of sport expresses the culture, values, attractiveness and prestige of a nation.186

According to the IOC, international sport and its events are a force capable of building bridges for intercultural dialogue and promoting human rights, equality, and world peace, aligning with the principles of cultural diplomacy.187 In a global context that pushes states to pay more attention to public diplomacy strategies, sport has risen in relevance as a foreign policy instrument capable of promoting a national narrative and boosting soft power.

Sport has been utilized by the Arab world as a platform for expressing political identity and strengthening the edification of nation-states.188 The Saudi State has traditionally found in sports an important tool for fostering a sense of community.189 Nowadays, it has turned into an instrument to boost the modernizing agenda190 and the foundation of a new identity based on a balance between exogenous factors and Arab, Muslim, and Saudi authenticity.191

In this sense, the strategic use of sport emerges as a tool for the Saudi regime to modify its identity in the West from a conservative stronghold into a modern and diverse country, but also as a key element in the nation-building process, equally necessary in order to export a culture. The ultimate aim of these objectives is none other than assuring the perpetuation of the Saudi model and the safeguard of the Al-Saud political legitimacy.

6.1. QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAM: A GLOBAL SPORTING DESTINATION

The Saudi Vision 2030 aims to broaden the entertainment dimensions and the scope of leisure opportunities available to citizens, which were very limited prior to 2018.192 The objective of turning Saudi Arabia into a global entertainment powerhouse suggests that the new leadership recognizes a desire among the youth for greater social freedoms and a wider range of recreational and cultural offerings.193 The State aims to partially live up to these expectations to compensate for the reduction in citizens' benefits.

The Internet has enabled the spreading of exogenous influences—related to alternative political, cultural, and religious systems—within the local population, eroding the contention that Wahhabism intended to provide.194 The younger generations have been exposed to Dubai's or Doha's lifestyles, which offer fewer restrictions and a richer cultural offer. To prevent religious radicalization, the unregulated circulation of alien ideas, and a possible exodus of young people, Saudi Arabia has been pushed to compete with its neighbours.195

In 2018, the Quality of Life Program was launched with the intention of ensuring inhabitants' participation and inclusion in cultural, sporting, touristic, and entertainment activities. Its pillars include infrastructure development, providing opportunities, broadening lifestyle options and organizing cultural and sporting events.

In order to diversify its economy and abandon the rentier paradigm, the Saudi Vision 2030 intends to orchestrate the construction of a Saudi sports industry that represents approximately 1.5% of the GDP. With the launch of the national development plan, the disbursement of US$650 million was announced for sports clubs to upgrade their facilities and boost the interest in sporting events.196

In 2016, the Ministry Council approved Mohammed bin Salman’s recommendation to advance with the “Sports Club Investment and Privatization Project”197 to create investment opportunities, boost professionalism, assure financial sustainability, and enhance teams’ competitiveness. Only in 2023 was the continuation of a process that began in 2002198 possible with the announcement of the transfer of a 75% share of the four most important national clubs: Al Hilal, Al Nassr, Al Ittihad and Al Ahli to the PIF.

The Quality of Life Program sets two objectives exclusively related to the sporting dimension: increasing public participation in physical activities and achieving regional and international excellence. In achieving these targets, as the document states, Saudi Arabia aims to become a global sports destination and fully integrate into the international sport ecosystem.

These efforts have been carried out through a series of eight main practices: sporting events organization, sports resources acquisitions, sports sponsoring, national clubs privatizations, reforms on women's role in sports and society, memorandums of understanding and partnership agreements, competent cultural ambassadors,199 and high performance strategies.200

Saudi intentions to become a global sports player have not gone unnoticed by Western audiences. Saudi Arabia has been the target of criticism from the media accusing the Kingdom of engaging in sports washing, a practice used by political regimes to divert attention towards its sports associations in order to conceal human, political, and labour rights abuses.201 If Mohammed bin Salman is indeed using sport as a medium to elicit benevolence within Western audiences, his naive efforts will probably fall on deaf ears. An international actor's image cannot be modified through a mere marketing campaign if it lacks substance and symbolic actions that demonstrate a change in behaviour.202 For the Kingdom, sport is also a communicative resource to globally publicise its internal reforms.

THE SPORTING BODY AS THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY OF MILLIONS

According to Saudi Vision 2030, the national identity should be something that citizens can take pride in. The discourse promoted by the central power constructs an identity by producing meanings about what the nation is.203 Due to the elusiveness of the components of the Saudi national identity, the voids must be filled with invented traditions.

Patriotism is not completely ingrained in the Arabian Peninsula as the national identity is not the primary source of personal identification among Arab youth.204 Thus, it must be inculcated through a series of practices that evoke an idealized past. “Sport, being inherently competitive and based on a hierarchical valuing of worth, binds people to the dominant traditions associated with the nation.”205

Historically, sport has been an important tool to forge a national identity through the generation of scenarios where a “nation” is materialized into something tangible.206 “The sporting body bears triumphant national mythologies in a double way: extending the body to encompass the nation and compressing it to obscure the social divisions that threaten national unity.”207 Sport can function as an “anchor of meaning” during a time when cultures are experiencing the effects of globalization and Western influence,208 which will most certainly pose a threat to local identities.209

Eric Hobsbawm applies Benedict Anderson’s concept of an “imagined community” to conceptualise sport as an effective instrument in the construction of a feeling of national belonging.210211 “The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people.”212

The approach adopted by the Saudi leadership has focused on glorifying Saudi geography, local architecture, and pre-Islamic heritage. The relationship between national sports and the landscapes they are commonly associated with helps us understand the reproduction of certain readings of the nation.213 Invented traditions tie together two landscapes: the real one, lying beneath our feet, and the perceived one, made up of remembered accounts and hypotheses about the real one.214

Traditional Saudi sports like dromedary races or falconry are closely related to the country's topography. In modern times, these disciplines pale in relevance vis a vis association football, which is regarded as the national sport due to being the most popular one. However, popularity is not the sole criterion the State has based its decision to support football's growth at the national level.215 It is also linked to how the Saudi nation is presented for the purposes of nation building, marketing domestic products, and promoting tourism.216

Tourism marketing communicates appealing images of the country, trying to influence perceptions through cognitive and affective elements. For example, Jeddah, aside from hosting football spectacles and the only Formula 1 nocturnal race, is a prominent commercial centre visited by millions of Muslim pilgrims due to its proximity to Mecca. The existence of projects like Diriyah and Al Ula, which enhance cultural heritage and national landscapes, endow the public efforts to forge an attractive nation with rich visual content. The former project consists in the conversion of the zone where the Al-Saud family originated into a touristic asset, while the latter is a World Heritage Site featuring ancient pagan monuments from the pre-Islamic era. The search for symbols of a Saudi nation that, while emphasizing its Islamic character, can also build distinct characteristics that appeal to new audiences has been favoured by the hosting of several sporting events.

The Saudi Tour, a cycling competition, unifies the sporting experience with a cultural one thanks to the landscapes of Al Ula. The SUV Xtreme E is an electric vehicle race that was held in NEOM, one of the giga-projects spearheaded by the PIF that aims to be fully sustainable. Diriyah has staged, among others, the Diriyah Cup, an international tennis competition, and the Diriyah ePrix, a race part of the Formula e Championship. Lastly, the Rally Dakar, a race that traverses inhospitable territories all around the Saudi geography, highlights the ambition to showcase the Kingdom's touristic and archaeological sites.

“These competitions fill the landscape with a ‘sense of place,’ a fundamental part of territorial identity and of geographical understanding.”217 Crucial in this process has been the media-sport production complex which projects images to large global audiences, allowing sport events to serve as vehicles for the expression of ideologies.218 Sport media are at the center of the inherent contradiction that international sport hosts since it offers consumers the possibility of crossing spaces and boundaries and establishes points of geographical identification for the audience.219

7.1. ELITE NATIONAL SPORT PERFORMANCES

Sports diplomacy resources can be turned into results in various ways. One effective strategy is achieving high performance.220 “Winners will mostly remain in the minds and hearts of the people as they play at the highest level of competition and the media pays more attention to these groups telling their stories among people.”221 Triumphs are a medium to conquer hearts and minds.

The Quality of Life Program describes sport as a fundamental part of the lives and culture of millions of Saudi citizens. Athletes are symbols that, through association, evoke and mold what it means to be part of a nation. Elite sports can function as an element that articulates national pride222 and promotes a shared national ideology to prepare citizens to serve for the greater national good.223 Football in Saudi Arabia evokes a national imagery that amalgamates the dislocated identities and obscures social diversity, as it is something that most Saudi nationals feel represented by.224

Following the Quality of Life Program, by the year 2030, at least fifty athletes should be representing Saudi Arabia at the Olympic level. The development of sports academies, like Mahd Sports Academy -inaugurated by the Minister of Sport, Abdulaziz bin Turki Al-Faisal- or Future Falcons, has already encouraged the development of students in their respective disciplines and enabled Saudi representation in international competitions. Public sports promotion has permitted several athletes, under the Elite Athletes' Development Programme, to achieve international success in disciplines like athletics, horse riding, snooker or muay thai, among others, which are exhibited in the annual report of the Quality of Life Program. International triumphs can elicit national identification within citizens225 and positively affect the Saudi identity within global audiences.

Instruction of local coaches is also a part of the sporting development process that has enabled joint work with American citizens based on shared values such as gender equity and inclusion thanks to teaching cooperation and cultural exchanges.226

7.2. COMPETENT CULTURAL AMBASSADORS 227

Sport, instrumentalized by nation-states, can serve as a melting pot between ingrained national custom and “universal” values, positively sanctioning innovations. Athletes can act as useful diplomatic mediums embodying cosmopolitan values while also representing a national identity.228 In the information age, individuals disseminate a nation's culture and values, becoming receptive and proactive agents in shaping an international agenda. This “glocal” nature of sport is key to understanding its value as a catalyst for a new Saudi identity that mixes tradition with modernity. Elite athletes, sports migrants and consumers have the capacity to reinterpret cultural products and experiences into something distinct.229

In order to achieve results, sports officials and athletes should convey the same messages as the diplomatic core of the country they represent.230 The program adopted in 2023 by Michael Emenalo, sporting director of the Saudi Pro League, aims to lure not only football stars, but also cultural ambassadors who elicit interest in the country among a new audience.231 Players bring their own cultures and traditions, cultivating a feeling of sincerity and mutual understanding that has a positive impact on Saudi Arabian’s international image. The nation is portrayed as one that values diversity and global connections.232

As part of the nationalist agenda, there has been an increase in public demonstrations of patriotism, especially on 23 September, the National Day of Saudi Arabia.233 Elite footballers have taken part in this phenomenon. Cristiano Ronaldo, who has been playing for Al-Nassr since 2023, was one of the protagonists of the festivity. Accompanied by his teammates, he danced the ardah, a national folkloric dance that is part of the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage List, in traditional Saudi attire. Neymar followed suit, representing the team he played for at that time, Al-Hilal. The performances were well received by Saudi audiences, who felt proud to showcase their national culture to the world.234

Both players have been subject to heavy media coverage. Their marketing campaigns for local companies were amplified by Arab media outlets that publish in English, such as Arab News, a portal perceived in the West as an outlet for the Saudi State, Al Arabiya, and APS—a public organism. Diplomatic efforts are more effective when they are communicated globally.235

Globalization, media power, international stars and economic, political and cultural interests have embedded sport in an irreversible cosmopolitan tendency236 that has been taken advantage of by the Saudi State. Through a universal language, the media related to the Government appeals to football lovers—especially those identified as “icon imitators” who admire particular athletes237— and turns players into globalized cultural models and symbols of a sports market that reaches the entire world.238 Access to the regulation of the flow of information constitutes a vital part of soft power239 that influences the translation of events in accordance with certain narratives.240

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CHANGE: SUFFICIENT OR NOT?

The expansion of the social sphere, as outlined in Vision 2030 and the Quality of Life Program, is structured around a compromise with equality and inclusion.241242 It endows women with a fundamental role in national economic and social transformation. The Saudi government has accelerated efforts initiated during Abdullah’s reign243 to incorporate women into Saudi society, to address economic necessity more than out of conviction to broaden women’s rights. This introduces a counterpoint to traditional religious discourse, since the Ulemas Council has historically conceived gender equality as against the sharia and natural law.244

The construction of a more open, generous and inclusive Saudi society has been one of the habitual preoccupations of the young citizens and one of the main objects of international exigences.245 The introduction of social reforms can be explained by the necessity of shielding legitimacy and restricting the emergence of bids for greater freedoms, but it is also related to international identity requirements towards the construction of a moderate image in which women constitute and mould the Saudi nation.

While Saudi Arabia’s goals of consolidating itself as a moderate and modern nation might seem inspiring, the feasibility of such a task remains uncertain. This strategy must be implemented through the effective execution of new political, social, cultural, educational, and economic innovations.246 This is what Anholt247 coined as the “substance” of a nation brand.

Both the Ministry of Sport and the Ministry of Education are endowed with the mission of achieving greater integration of women into the sports ecosystem, especially within the educational apparatus. Since 2017, physical education has been made compulsory in schools for girls, but it has faced several shortcomings in terms of infrastructure and personnel that have delayed its progress. According to official sources, there has been an increase in the amount of women engaging in physical activities, both as athletes and coaches, as well as in the quantity of women’s gyms.248

2018 was a paradigmatic year as women were finally allowed to drive and prohibitions preventing them from participating in or attending sporting events were lifted.249 Following these milestones were the inauguration of several women competences or leagues of golf, football, basketball, and volleyball that allowed the rise of female role models such as Yusra Abduljadayel.

The Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee and other sporting institutions have started incorporating women into leadership positions.250 Princess Reema bint Bandar Al-Saud, a member of the International Olympic Committee, was the one designated to embody the social reforms towards diversity and gender equality.251 Now serving as the Saudi ambassador to the United States, she previously held positions as Deputy of Planning and Development and Vice President of Women's Affairs at the Sports Ministry. In these roles, she supported the reduction of barriers targeting women's sports and their access to stadiums.252

In North America, Princess Reema, with the support of lobbying companies, carried out several meetings with the objective of developing Saudi Arabia's sports industry. She was interviewed by the likes of Reuters, CNN, and The Washington Post, where she asserted her commitment to publicise reforms for the social status of women in Saudi Arabia.253

Notwithstanding these reforms, the role of Saudi women in society is still strictly limited by an underlying matter: the guardianship system, which is sustained by a reinforced authoritarian apparatus. This structure, although revised, still treats women as second-class citizens who require the permission of a male guardian to, for example, travel or manage their wealth independently. Manahel al-Otaibi and Salma al-Shehab, Saudi women who used social media to call for a reform of this system and to support women’s rights, were sentenced to 11 and 34 years in prison, respectively.254

Even if the changes have dimly broadened women’s educational, working, and sporting opportunities, they are insufficient to empower them and make them active participants in a Saudi nation that appeals to Western sensibilities. Their ability to make life choices is still severely restricted. However, pushing for further social reforms might alienate internal audiences and lead to internal incongruencies that could threaten political legitimacy. The introduction of such changes must be gradual in the eyes of the Crown Prince, as they are not based on conviction but on socioeconomic needs. The speed at which the Saudi State advances with new social reforms will depend on economic conditions. The Saudi political elite has intended to achieve a balance that allows for reform according to both national and international standards.

The new Saudi lifestyle, featuring more visible women and a thriving sports and entertainment industry, has been exported through sports diplomacy in order to generate new sports power resources. All these actions are part of a sports diplomacy strategy with bidirectional communicative purposes: meeting internal demands and engaging with key international actors and audiences. As Saudi changes and intentions may go under the radar without media coverage, symbolic actions that communicate national policies, culture, and values are essential.

THE COMMUNICATIVE POWER OF SPORTS

Communication is an activity organized according to objectives, one of which is the maintenance of a good reputation. Sport is a symbolic action for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This refers to a particular species of substance with intrinsic communicative power; a component of the national story that is also the means to tell it.255 Collective ideals that emerged from experiences of change can only become manifest by being realized in symbols: emblems, places, dates, words, and people that can be seen and understood by all.256

Symbolic actions and soft power require consistency through time to build a believable image.257 A dissonance between narrative and practice can trigger a soft disempowerment258 process, a scenario where Saudi Arabia's ability to exert influence in the International System is diminished due to the persistence of critiques related to the absence of a change perceived as legitimate. They can't be devoid of substance since the simplistic act of selling images and spreading narratives has low probabilities of being effective.259

The modification of the national identity in the international dimension must, to a certain extent, adapt to the moral standards of the West to reduce the negative impact. To validate its proclamations that it has reformed women’s rights and has carried out an important societal change, the Kingdom has used sporting cooperation memorandums, sports sponsorship, sports resource acquisitions, and sporting events as symbolic actions.

CONCLUSION

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in the midst of a complex process that involves a series of profound changes. With the perception of royal legitimacy under threat, Mohammed bin Salman as the de facto ruler of the country has commanded a new generation in charge to assure the perpetuation of the Saudi model through reforming of the socioeconomic ecosystem, nation forging, and transforming its international identity.

Saudi Vision 2030 was born as a result of turbulent events that changed the systemic, regional, and national landscapes during the 21st century. It addresses numerous demands from the youth constituency and global audiences in a top-down fashion that is not meant to open the associational space. This national development plan is a reflection of the Crown Prince's ambition to maintain power by broadening the socioeconomic sphere and reshaping religious legitimacy. Simultaneously, these changes have enabled a reinforcement of authoritarianism and concentration of power.

The new nationalistic drive of Saudi Vision 2030 has been covered by several scholars, but the role of sports in this narrative and how they have influenced the fluid and everchanging nature of the Saudi nation remains a void in the literature that this article has intended to partially fill. Furthermore, this article seeks to explore how this new international identity, a more covered area, can be viewed through a constructivist lens to enrich the debate over Saudi Arabia’s strategic use of sport. Identity in the International System is a category that will continue rising its relevance in a densely interconnected world, prompting states to develop new public diplomacy strategies to engage with global audiences. By grounding this field of study, and this particular topic, in international relations theory, scholars can move beyond simplistic explanations.

The strategic use of sport has been designated by the Saudi leadership as a catalyst for the modernizing agenda and the foundation of a novel national identity in front of both internal and external audiences. The goal is to endow the Saudi nation with a body that obscures social divisions—which the State has exploited through its patronage networks—that have for long blocked the consolidation of a unified identity. National athletes and teams have been used to configure a communitarian sphere without broadening the associational life. The Kingdom has sensibly increased its investments in sporting resources on a global scale in order to modify interaction patterns and intersubjective meanings that have reproduced its identity as a conservative and closed monarchy.

To achieve its national objectives, the Kingdom has attempted to build a soft power applicable to a broader sphere beyond the Arab and Muslim ones and transform the identitarian structure of its relationship with the West. Athletes, both national and international, have served as an anchor in the incorporation of exogenous elements. Sporting events have also been instrumentalized to extrapolate this new national identity that combines Saudi, Arab, Muslim, and pre-Islamic cultural heritage with “universal” values. Media coverage has amplified the publicity of internal social reforms concerning women's social roles, and the Saudi Government's narrative depicts Saudi Arabia as an open, moderate, diverse, proud, and modern nation, constituting these as symbolic actions.

However, the test of time and consistency erects as a limitation to the Saudi Arabian strategy. Legitimacy in the International System emanates from positive stimuli from other international actors, and it cannot be built on a narrative without substance. Soft power construction requires congruence between the values wielded and behaviour observed, as well as continuity between national and international landscapes.

The main problem with basing the modification of a State's international image on the strategic use of sport is that it not only attracts positive attention but also sheds light on negative aspects. Negative stimuli, like sports washing denounces, contribute to soft disempowerment and impair the consolidation of moral authority. If Saudi Arabia can efficiently use sport as a medium to achieve its national objectives and leverage its international position remains a question whose answer will depend on its capacity to continue to absorb and reconcile internal and external exigencies, uphold shared values and principles, and preserve consistency and continuity over time.

This article intends to go beyond simple accusations of sportswashing. This does not mean not engaging with the evident contradictions between narrative and action, which have been addressed in order to show how they affect soft power resources. It is important to examine Saudi Arabia’s strategic use of sport through a multidimensional lens that reveals all the motives behind it. The ultimate aim of this investigation is to enhance the discussions on the convergence of international relations and sports, which is increasingly relevant nowadays.

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