Izvorni znanstveni članak
Understanding Objectification: Is There Special Wrongness Involved in Treating Human Beings Instrumentally?
Evangelia Papadaki
; Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete, Greece
Sažetak
This article centres around objectification. It offers an analysis of the notions that are involved in this phenomenon, their moral wrongness, as well as the connections that exist between them. Martha Nussbaum has suggested that seven notions are involved in objectification: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity. She espouses the view that the instrumentalisation of human beings (the treatment of human beings instrumentally to achieve our purposes) is especially problematic as compared to the other ways in which we can treat human beings as objects (for example, denying their autonomy and subjectivity, or treating them as violable). In this paper, I argue against the view that instrumentalisation should be thought of as more suspicious from a moral point of view than the rest of the ways in which people can be treated as objects. Singling out extreme instrumentality for being especially problematic might lead us to underestimate the wrongness involved in the other ways of treating human beings as objects, and can therefore potentially distort our understanding of what, more generally, is wrong with objectifying human beings.
Ključne riječi
Instrumentalisation; instrumentality; Kant; Nussbaum; objectification
Hrčak ID:
83141
URI
Datum izdavanja:
15.6.2012.
Posjeta: 11.191 *