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Confronting philosophical objections to Chomskyan linguistics

Mark J. Cain

Sažetak

In this paper I consider some of the most prominent philosophical challenges to the viability of Chomskyan linguistics. The challenges in question are generated by the work of Quine, Kripke and Crispin Wright. I respond to these challenges by developing an account of rule representation that appeals to the lower level causal workings of a particular component of the mind-brain that plays a fundamental role in grounding our linguistic capacities. This account draws upon various elements of Chomsky’s core commitments.
These include his modularity thesis, his view that the language faculty owes its status as such to its relations to other in-head systems, his general conception of the relationship between the mind and the brain, and his nativist conception of language acquisition.

Ključne riječi

Chomsky; modularity; representation; nativism; ceteris paribus laws

Hrčak ID:

91121

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/91121

Datum izdavanja:

10.11.2005.

Posjeta: 1.003 *