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The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics

James Lenman

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (224 KB) str. 37-50 preuzimanja: 242* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Lenman, J. (2005). The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 1 (2), 37-50. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123
MLA 8th Edition
Lenman, James. "The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 1, br. 2, 2005, str. 37-50. https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123. Citirano 24.06.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition
Lenman, James. "The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1, br. 2 (2005): 37-50. https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123
Harvard
Lenman, J. (2005). 'The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 1(2), str. 37-50. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123 (Datum pristupa: 24.06.2019.)
Vancouver
Lenman J. The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2005 [pristupljeno 24.06.2019.];1(2):37-50. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123
IEEE
J. Lenman, "The Saucer of mud, The Kudzu vine and the uxorious cheetah: Against neo-Aristotelian naturalism in metaethics", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.1, br. 2, str. 37-50, 2005. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123. [Citirano: 24.06.2019.]

Sažetak
The early part of this paper criticizes Anscombe and Quinn on the relationship between value and desire. Their influential discussions of strange and unusual desires do not, I argue, show what they are intended to show. The remainder focuses primarily on the views of Foot, discussing her objections to subjectivism and in particular expressivism. The expressivist, she claims, can not make adequate sense of the way we apply evaluative terms to nonsentient living things such as plants. I argue to the contrary and urge that the metaethical significance of such applications is greatly exaggerated by Foot and other neo-Aristotelian naturalists.

Ključne riječi
Ethics; Naturalism; Ffoot; P.; Anscombe; Gg. E. M.; Quinn; W.; Hursthouse; R

Hrčak ID: 91123

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/91123

Posjeta: 386 *