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Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions

Carolyn Price

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (170 KB) str. 49-68 preuzimanja: 710* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Price, C. (2006). Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2 (1), 49-68. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607
MLA 8th Edition
Price, Carolyn. "Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 2, br. 1, 2006, str. 49-68. https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607. Citirano 11.04.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Price, Carolyn. "Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2, br. 1 (2006): 49-68. https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607
Harvard
Price, C. (2006). 'Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2(1), str. 49-68. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607 (Datum pristupa: 11.04.2021.)
Vancouver
Price C. Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2006 [pristupljeno 11.04.2021.];2(1):49-68. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607
IEEE
C. Price, "Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.2, br. 1, str. 49-68, 2006. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607. [Citirano: 11.04.2021.]

Sažetak
Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability (understood as an angry mood) and apprehension (understood as a fearful mood), which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear.

Ključne riječi
emotion; mood; intentionality; teleosemantic theory of content; state of vigilance

Hrčak ID: 91607

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/91607

Posjeta: 1.041 *