Izvorni znanstveni članak
Moral emotions, principles, and the locus of moral perception
Joseph E. Corbi
Sažetak
I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. Following on from Bbernard Williams, I talk of an agent’s character as a factor that contributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point, in the debate, will be how an agent confronts the normatively loaded features of his own character when he is engaged in first-person deliberation.
Ključne riječi
particularism; generalism; morality; emotion; perception; guilt
Hrčak ID:
92069
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.6.2006.
Posjeta: 1.205 *