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Putnam, Pragmatism and the Fate of Metaphysics
David Macarthur
Sažetak
Putnam has called for a renewal of philosophy by
invoking the names of Wittgenstein and Dewey,
both strong critics of traditional metaphysics. In
the light of his own attacks on various forms of
metaphysics (e.g. metaphysical realism, the fact/
value distinction), one question that arises is
this: what is the fate of metaphysics in Putnam’s
vision of philosophy? The present paper explores
this question by reading Putnam as committed
to a broadly pragmatist approach to metaphysics
exemplified in different ways by James and
Dewey. I end by providing several different ways
of understanding Putnam’s claim that “there is
a sense in which it is the task of philosophy to
overcome metaphysics and a sense in which its
task is to continue metaphysical discussion”.
Ključne riječi
Putnam; metaphysics; pragmatism; James; Dewey
Hrčak ID:
93229
URI
Datum izdavanja:
18.9.2008.
Posjeta: 1.682 *