Pregledni rad
The Problem of Evil in contemporary analytical Philosophy of Religion - Evil as a Step to grater Good
Aleksandra Golubović
orcid.org/0000-0002-5606-0542
Jelena Kopajtić
orcid.org/0000-0003-4073-4634
Sažetak
The problem of evil is usually formulated as such: there is a God to whom we attribute specific perfections (omnipotence, omniscience and goodness), and there is also an evil. From these two premises, according to some authors, we can conclude that God and evil can not co-exist. Because if God really does possesses all these aforementioned perfections, how can we explain the existence of evil in the world? However some philosophers of religion argue that God and evil can indeed be compatible and that God certainly has some (justified) reason for permitting evil to exist.
In this paper we will present the basics in relation of the problem of evil and we will specifically analyze one of the most common solutions, the so-called free will defence. According to this solution, man is responsible for evil which can even, in most cases, aid him in the accomplishment of some good. Although this problem, i.e. evil in this sense, is not encountered within Eastern religions, they too, have a theory according to which evil can possess a potentially positive, i.e. good purpose. They have developed this thesis through theories of reincarnation i.e. karma. Whilst analysing the Easterners` solution to the problem, we can conclude that karma (in its essence) can, in a specific sense, be an acceptable answer to the problem of evil, especially due to the positive effects that will arise form man’s effort to free himself from it.
To conclude, in this paper evil is not only perceived within the context of man’s responsibility for its existence, but also for the freeing of that same evil. This viewpoint is due to the fact that all great world religions offer similar solutions to the problem of evil.
Ključne riječi
God; moral evil; physical evil; free will defence
Hrčak ID:
85044
URI
Datum izdavanja:
20.7.2012.
Posjeta: 6.342 *