Izvorni znanstveni članak
Kant, Hegel, Heller and the Ambivalent Constitution of Freedom
Werner Becker
; Sveučilište u Giessenu, Giessen, Njemačka
Sažetak
The author shows that it is not possible to formulate a consistent
theory of freedom, tying together the internal perspective of action, and
the extemal perspective of rational description and explanation of action.
ln the history of philosophical discussion about freedom as a fundamental
concept of liberalism Kant and Hegel represent two extremes. Each tried
to formulate consistently a concept of freedom and its moral and polilical
consequences but both paid the price of one-sidedness. Kant postulates
the primacy of the internal perspective of the moral subject, which is
ideally expressed by his categorical imperative. However, the concept
of freedom defined from the stance of autonomous morals loses conflict
with historical world or traditional values, with the consequence of
moralizing politics and unrealistically disregarding the nation as a
characteristic framework of politics. Hegel points out the priority of the
external perspective, which gives him an analytical advantage relative to
liberal theories of natural law and Kant's moralist position. However,
as warned by the German political theorist Hermann Heller, Hegel's
position results in defining the sphere of collective morality as superior
to individual action, disregarding the protection of individual liberties
against the state and accepting national politics of power as the only
criterion for international politics. The author concludes that liberal
constitutions, unlike totalitarian, must then be inconsistent.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
111134
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.1993.
Posjeta: 1.920 *