Revija za sociologiju, Vol. 28 No. 3-4, 1997.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Realism and Relativist Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
Davorka Matić
; Odsjek za sociologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Sažetak
The sociology of scientific knowledge is often criticized for its relativism and idealism. However, idealism is niether necessary nor beneficial for the sociological analysis of science. Nor is it logically connected with relativism. Some forms of relativism may very well he compatible with a certain type of realism. The relativism argued here does not deny that the external world influences the conclusions of science, but denies that this world uniquely determines those conclusions. By assuming the realist belief in one single external reality, this relativism stands in opposition to all sorts of idealistic accounts which claim that there is no reality separate from us and our experience of it. It is wrong, therefore, to think that in order to be consistent with its own epistemological premises relativist sociology of scientific knowledge must abandon realism. The experience with reflexivity clearly shows that sociology must preserve the realist mode of speech in order to teach us anything interesting about science and knowledge in general. Otherwise, it becomes an irrelevant discipline.
Ključne riječi
realism; relativism; idealism; sociology of scientific knowledge; ethnomethodology
Hrčak ID:
154469
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.12.1997.
Posjeta: 2.903 *