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https://doi.org/10.31192/np.16.1.1

The problem of intuition of morality in John Rawl’s philosophy

Marko Jakić orcid id orcid.org/0000-0001-7643-855X


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 133 Kb

str. 5-20

preuzimanja: 412

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Sažetak

The article deals with the possible view point paradox in John Rawls’s philosophy. The introductory part critically outlines relevant contemporary theoretical views of the problem of the intuition of morality; with particular regard to direct intuitionism, relativism, and doctrinal moral pluralism. Rawls’ theoretical position has been extracted in the central part of the article together with the arguments in support of the assertion of his theoretical position as a foundationalist indirect intuitionism. Additional arguments in support of Rawls’ assertion of his principles of justice as the theoretical (ethical) higher principles have been analyzed. In conclusion, it has been shown that there is no view point paradox of the intuition of morality in his philosophy.

Ključne riječi

intuition, justice, fairness, equality, foundationalism

Hrčak ID:

196227

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/196227

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 801 *