Skoči na glavni sadržaj

Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 32 No. 2, 2017.

Izvorni znanstveni članak

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp32205

Understanding and Nonunderstanding in Practical-Relational Hermeneutics of Ludwig Wittgeinstein

Josip Oslić ; University of Zagreb, Catholic Faculty of Theology, Vlaška 38, HR–10000 Zagreb

Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 399 Kb

str. 335-348

preuzimanja: 349

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Puni tekst: engleski pdf 399 Kb

str. 335-348

preuzimanja: 413

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Puni tekst: francuski pdf 399 Kb

str. 335-348

preuzimanja: 291

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Puni tekst: njemački pdf 399 Kb

str. 335-348

preuzimanja: 401

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Sažetak

In the following paper on Ludwing Wittgenstein, conditions for the possibility of understanding sentence/proposition is considered, firstly by itself, and then in the context of the whole speech/text. In relation to rational logic, but also hermeneutics, for Wittgenstein in Philosophical Grammar the following key question is posed: How is it possible to talk about ‘understanding’ and ‘nonunderstanding’ – is not that something is a sentence only when it is understood? (L. Wittgenstein, WA 4, p. 5). Expanding this problem to the level of language as a whole, Wittgenstein desires to show how “language has to speak for itself” (ibid.), that language is not a private creation of an individual subject and its arbitrarity, but rather that language itself makes suggestions to the speaker about “meaning” and “sense”, thanks to which one can even formulate a meaningful sentence, and equally so to understand a sentence of the “other” speaker. Ultimately it is a paradox – through an individual subject, language speaks with itself.

Ključne riječi

understanding; nonunderstanding; hermeneutics; meaning; sense; language; subject; Ludwig Wittgenstein

Hrčak ID:

200197

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/200197

Datum izdavanja:

30.4.2018.

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