Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 27 No. 4, 2007.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Pyrrhonism and Relativism
Filip Grgić
Sažetak
In this paper an attempt is made to show that there is a kind of relativism that can be seen as compatible with Sextus Empiricus’ scepticism. It is argued that in PH I.217–219, Protagoras is not treated as alethic or epistemic relativist, but as a relativist in a minimal sense of the word, and that such a position is not at odds with Sextus’ characterisation of Pyrrhonism in PH I. It is then shown that recognising this aspect of Pyrrhonism can help us explain the otherwise problematic relativistic conclusions in Sextus’ works, esp. in M XI.
Ključne riječi
Sextus Empiricus; Protagoras; Pyrrhonian scepticism; relativism; appearances; beliefs
Hrčak ID:
19712
URI
Datum izdavanja:
28.1.2008.
Posjeta: 4.122 *