Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 38 No. 2, 2018.
Pregledni rad
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi38210
Thinking about Collective Intentionality as a Mechanism
Matija Lukač
; Psihijatrijska bolnica Rab, Kampor 224, HR-51280 Kampor
Sažetak
The papers aim is to investigate if collective intentionality is potentially a mechanism and can it be characterised by one of the two fundamental approaches to the mechanism, by Glennan's concept and/or MDC concept. The paper does not offer an answer to the debate on the nature of collective intentionality, but instead, it attempts to underline what philosophers may learn from it. The reading and interpretation in this paper are not entirely similar to Cohen's understanding of intentionality. While Cohen believes that collective intentionality is altogether reducible to individual intentionality, this paper is more of an epistemological question regarding the right way of defining collective intentionality as a mechanism. The first part of the paper refers to determining the role of the very debate on collective intentionality. Epistemological and socio-ontological positions in role-defining the collective intentionality is considered, along with its explanation, method of research, and the argument that both analysis encounters similar problems (irreducibility of collective intentionality to individual intentionality). In the second part of the paper, I examine the role of this debate and what can we learn from it. More correctly, I intend to explore does collective intentionality has the potential of mechanisms, that is, can it be characterised as a mechanism if we guide ourselves with the concept of mechanism developed in contemporary philosophy of mechanism.
Ključne riječi
Laurence Jonathan Cohen; intentionality; collective intentionality; mechanism; new mechanistic philosophy
Hrčak ID:
211802
URI
Datum izdavanja:
9.7.2018.
Posjeta: 2.635 *