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https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.1.1

Quine's Poor Tom

Tristan Grøtvedt Haze ; The University of Sydney


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 259 Kb

str. 5-16

preuzimanja: 547

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Sažetak

Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.

Ključne riječi

belief contexts; referential transparency; opacity; Quine; perspicuity

Hrčak ID:

217351

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/217351

Datum izdavanja:

25.2.2019.

Posjeta: 1.620 *