Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 20 No. 2, 2005.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT
MARK A. WRATHALL
Sažetak
The phenomenological tradition has long contended that natural perception is neither conceptually articulated nor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized according to the practically articulated structure of bodily being-in-the-world. But this leaves the problem of explaining how perception can provide justificatory support to thought. The phenomenologists’ answer is to say that the meaningful (but not conceptual) structure of natural perception makes it possible for us to think about objects by motivating particular thoughts about the objects as they present themselves in perception. I show how this view provides a way out of worries that plague contemporary philosophy of mind.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
2418
URI
Datum izdavanja:
20.12.2005.
Posjeta: 2.349 *