Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31192/np.20.1.3
The Moral Relevance of Intentions
Matej Sušnik
; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
The debate about the moral relevance of intentions today boils down to the question of whether intentions are relevant to moral permissibility. Those who answer this question affirmatively justify their position by drawing the distinction between intentional harm and harm that occurs as an unintended, but forseeable side-effect of an action. In this article, I critically examine this view—also known as the principle of double effect—and propose an alternative understanding of the moral relevance of intentions. According to this understanding, the basis of moral praise and blame does not lie in the performed act, but rather in the intention with which an action is performed.
Ključne riječi
intention; moral blame; moral permissibility; moral praise; principle of double effect
Hrčak ID:
274135
URI
Datum izdavanja:
17.3.2022.
Posjeta: 1.100 *