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ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN

Tomislav Vukina
Danijel Nestić


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 110 Kb

str. 24-47

preuzimanja: 633

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Puni tekst: engleski pdf 427 Kb

str. 24-47

preuzimanja: 1.190

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Sažetak

In this paper, we conduct simple micro-level econometric tests for the presence of the moral hazard and adverse selection manifestations in the Croatian supplemental health insurance program. Despite the fact that the obtained results are rather preliminary, they seem to be indicating the statistically significant presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard types of problems with various degrees of difficulty that they actually cause to the functioning of the Croatian health insurance system. The obtained results are then used to outline several policy recommendations in the realm of health insurance reform.

Ključne riječi

health insurance, adverse selection, moral hazard

Hrčak ID:

25947

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 3.253 *