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ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN
Tomislav Vukina
Danijel Nestić
Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 110 Kb
str. 24-47
preuzimanja: 773
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Vukina, T. i Nestić, D. (2008). ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18 (115), 24-47. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
MLA 8th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav i Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol. 18, br. 115, 2008, str. 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. Citirano 24.11.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav i Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika 18, br. 115 (2008): 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
Harvard
Vukina, T., i Nestić, D. (2008). 'ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN', Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18(115), str. 24-47. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947 (Datum pristupa: 24.11.2024.)
Vancouver
Vukina T, Nestić D. ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 24.11.2024.];18(115):24-47. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
IEEE
T. Vukina i D. Nestić, "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN", Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol.18, br. 115, str. 24-47, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. [Citirano: 24.11.2024.]
Puni tekst: engleski pdf 427 Kb
str. 24-47
preuzimanja: 1.385
citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Vukina, T. i Nestić, D. (2008). ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18 (115), 24-47. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
MLA 8th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav i Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol. 18, br. 115, 2008, str. 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. Citirano 24.11.2024.
Chicago 17th Edition
Vukina, Tomislav i Danijel Nestić. "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN." Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika 18, br. 115 (2008): 24-47. https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
Harvard
Vukina, T., i Nestić, D. (2008). 'ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN', Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, 18(115), str. 24-47. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947 (Datum pristupa: 24.11.2024.)
Vancouver
Vukina T, Nestić D. ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN. Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 24.11.2024.];18(115):24-47. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
IEEE
T. Vukina i D. Nestić, "ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN", Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika, vol.18, br. 115, str. 24-47, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947. [Citirano: 24.11.2024.]
Sažetak
In this paper, we conduct simple micro-level econometric tests for the presence of the moral hazard and adverse selection manifestations in the Croatian supplemental health insurance program. Despite the fact that the obtained results are rather preliminary, they seem to be indicating the statistically significant presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard types of problems with various degrees of difficulty that they actually cause to the functioning of the Croatian health insurance system. The obtained results are then used to outline several policy recommendations in the realm of health insurance reform.
Ključne riječi
health insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard
Hrčak ID:
25947
URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/25947
Datum izdavanja:
30.7.2008.
Podaci na drugim jezicima:
hrvatski
Posjeta: 4.445
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