Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1844586
Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition
Fernanda A. Ferreira
Flávio Ferreira
Oana R. Bode
Sažetak
In this paper we consider, on one hand, a differentiated Cournot
model, and, on the other hand, a differentiated Bertrand model,
when one of the firms engages in an R&D process that gives an
endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim of the present
paper is two-fold. The first is to study the licensing of the costreduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee in these Cournot
and Bertrand models. The second is to do a direct comparison
between Cournot model and Bertrand model. We analyse the
implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D
effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the
social welfare. We show that some previous results for two-part
tariff licensing are not robust, in the sense that they can be not
true for just either a per-unit royalty contract or a fixed-fee contract. Furthermore, by using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods assumes
a great importance in the results. We also discuss the optimal
licensing, meaning that which licensing method is preferred, in
each of the duopoly models considered.
Ključne riječi
Licensing; Cournot competition; Bertrand competition; differentiated goods
Hrčak ID:
301253
URI
Datum izdavanja:
31.12.2021.
Posjeta: 128 *