Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31192/np.21.2.13
The role of Marr’s Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Sciences
Marko Jurjako
orcid.org/0000-0002-7252-8627
; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet, Odsjek za filozofiju i Katedra za kognitivne znanosti, Rijeka, Hrvatska
Sažetak
This paper considers the question of whether the influential distinction between levels of explanation introduced by David Marr can be used as a general framework for contemplating levels of explanation in cognitive sciences. Marr introduced three levels at which we can explain cognitive processes: the computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels. Some argue that Marr’s levels of explanation can only be applied to modular cognitive systems. However, since many psychological processes are non-modular, it seems that Marr’s levels of explanation cannot explain such psychological processes. To show that the latter claim is not convincing, the paper draws upon an influential paradigm from cognitive sciences that is based on the principle of free energy. Based on this paradigm, the paper argues that even non-modular psychological processes can be computationally analyzed and algorithmically implemented. The conclusion of the paper is that, at least under the assumption that the function of the mind is to minimize free energy, Marr’s levels of explanation can be successfully used as a general framework for understanding psychological processes at different levels of description.
Ključne riječi
active inference; cognitive sciences; Marr’s levels of explanation; predictive coding; the principle of free energy minimization
Hrčak ID:
306180
URI
Datum izdavanja:
17.7.2023.
Posjeta: 1.155 *