Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2022.2135554
Partial passive ownership holdings and R&D risk choices in a differentiated duopoly
Mingqing Xing
Tingting Tan
Sažetak
This study investigates the R&D risk choices in a differentiated
duopoly, in which a firm has partial passive ownership holdings
(P.P.O.s) in its rival. Firms perform R&D projects with identical
expected outcomes but different risk degrees. It mainly finds that:
(1) the P.P.O.s make both firms more willing to take R&D risks; (2)
compared with the firm which owns a share of its rival, its partially
owned rival is more willing to take R&D risks; (3) for both
firms, their private incentive for R&D risk is lower than the social
incentive. However, the P.P.O.s may make the private optimum
closer to the social optimum.
Ključne riječi
risk; R&D; partial passive ownership (P.P.O.); duopoly; Cournot competition
Hrčak ID:
306693
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.4.2023.
Posjeta: 121 *