Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 38 No. 1, 2023.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp38109
Reconceiving the Conceivability Argument for Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind
Hane Htut Maung
orcid.org/0000-0003-0979-5180
; Lancaster University, Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion, Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YL, UK
Sažetak
In the philosophical literature on consciousness and the mind-body problem, the conceivability argument against physicalism is usually taken to support a form of dualism between physicality and phenomenality. Usually, the discussion focuses on the qualitative character of experience, which is what the phenomenal feel of a given experience is like. By contrast, the subjective character of experience, or its individuation to a given first-person subject, tends to be set aside. The aim of this paper is to present a new and more robust version of the conceivability argument for dualism that appeals to the subjective character of experience. Drawing on insights by philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, I conceptualise the first-person subjective character of experience as a transcendental condition of possibility for phenomenality that cannot be reduced to third-person facts about the physical world. Given this, the mind-body problem as it pertains to consciousness does not merely concern the inability of the set of physical facts about a brain state to capture the qualitative character of experience, but concerns the existential issue of why this brain state is accompanied by first-person subjectivity at all. This allows us to reconceive the conceivability argument in a way that presents a stronger case for dualism than the traditional version of the argument.
Ključne riječi
consciousness; philosophical phenomenology; subjectivity; experiential dimension; dualism; conceivability argument
Hrčak ID:
308296
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.9.2023.
Posjeta: 363 *