Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.69.4
Intentionalism and the Natural Interpretation of Discourses
Alexandru Radulescu
; University of Missouri, Columbia, USA
Sažetak
Intentionalism is the view that a demonstrative refers to something partly in virtue of the speaker intending it to refer to that thing. In recent work, Una Stojnić has argued that the natural interpretation of demonstratives in some discourses is that they do not refer to the objects intended by the speaker, and instead refer to other things. In this paper, I defend intentionalism against this charge. In particular, I argue that the data presented by Stojnić can be explained from an intentionalist point of view. The explanations take two forms: either the audience’s reaction to the discourse does not concern reference, or the natural interpretation is wrong. This latter claim has been defended by Stojnić in other work as applied to word identifi cation and is neutral between intentionalism and Stojnić’s objectivism. It is also very plausible. But it takes away the import of the argument from natural interpretation, at least in the form discussed here.
Ključne riječi
Demonstratives; reference; intentionalism; objectivism.
Hrčak ID:
312460
URI
Datum izdavanja:
28.12.2023.
Posjeta: 584 *