Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 39 No. 1, 2024.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp39109
“Either Being or beings” – about a Fundamental Misunderstanding of Heidegger’s Concept of Being
Karl Kraatz
orcid.org/0000-0001-6957-115X
; Zhejiang Universität, Institut für Philosophie, Zijingang Campus, Zhejiang Universität, 866 Yuhangtang Rd., CN–310058 Hangzhou
Sažetak
Heidegger’s philosophy has been criticized by famous philosophers for decades for the fact that in his philosophy everything is subordinated to the one question of Being. According to their view, Heidegger’s emphasis on Being led to a blindness regarding the affordances of beings. It is assumed that Being has no relation to beings. In this paper, with regard to what Heidegger calls the “concrete universality” of the concept of Being, it is shown that the criticism is unjustified. I will explore Heidegger’s claim that questions about Being must be understood as a concretization (Konkretisierung) of beings. In order to clarify and refute the criticism of Heidegger, Heidegger’s understanding of the concrete generality of the concept of being must be addressed. It is shown that Heidegger, based on his work on formally indicating concepts, assumes a necessary mediation between the universality of concepts and the concreteness of philosophizing. For Heidegger, philosophy is both conceptual work and existential commitment.
Ključne riječi
Martin Heidegger; ontology; methodology; formal indication; problem of universals
Hrčak ID:
321377
URI
Datum izdavanja:
11.10.2024.
Posjeta: 284 *