Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 44 No. 2, 2024.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi44202
Kant’s (Rational) Conceptualization of Property Rights and Comparison in Private Law Theory and Civil Law Doctrine
Tomislav Nedić
orcid.org/0000-0003-4344-8465
; Sveučilište Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku, Pravni fakultet Osijek, Stjepana Radića 13, HR–31000 Osijek
Sažetak
Kant’s (rational) understanding of possession and property rights is conceptually and ideally placed in a comparative relation to private law theory, civil law doctrine, and positive legislation. Property law in the objective sense as “a set of all the laws concerning real”, external “mine and yours” is enforceable exclusively in the civil state where the final acquisition of property rights occurs, the a priori of which is reflected in possession. According to Kant, control over things in possession is a noumenon, a mental (rational) connection between a person and a thing. In contrast, a phaenomenon, a sensible (physical) connection between a thing and a person, is only its physical reflection, whereby such processing of possession can serve as an essential explanation of the so-called “spiritualized possession”, which, as a belonging genus proximum with intelligible possession, was also mentioned in the civil law doctrine. Every establishment of property rights is preceded by the original common property, common to all people as a practical rational concept that, in its own right, contains the principle that people can use a certain place on Earth according to “legal laws”. Property rights and their acquisition arise from the mind because they are based on intelligible possession, that is, power and an intelligible relationship between a person and a thing, in which a person, as the owner of a thing, of his own free will, obliges others with regard to the use of the thing. The stated will must follow the axiom of external freedom, the postulate of power, and the united will of all. Under permissive law, we are authorized to appropriate external facilities as we choose to the extent that our use does not infringe on another person’s freedom. Otherwise, we are deprived of our own freedom, and any limitation of (private) property is against our individual and united will of all in recognizing property rights.
Ključne riječi
Immanuel Kant; property rights; possession; property; private law; civil law
Hrčak ID:
327508
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.11.2024.
Posjeta: 188 *