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https://doi.org/10.52685/pihfb.51.2(102).7
Pavao Vuk-Pavlović’s Metaphysics of Cognition
Tomislav Dretar
; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Filip Grgić
; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
This paper examines the status of epistemology in the philosophy of Pavao Vuk- Pavlović. In the first chapter, we analyze in detail the structure of cognition and its rootedness in experience. In the second chapter, we argue that this analysis belongs to metaphysics rather than epistemology, and we point out several issues related to Vuk-Pavlović’s conception of metaphysics. The third chapter highlights certain shortcomings in his understanding of the theory of objects, while the final chapter addresses ambiguities in his view of epistemology as a kind of applied or practical science (nauka). In conclusion, we argue that Vuk-Pavlović’s account of the status of epistemology leaves too many important questions unanswered to support the claim that he has definitively shown that the starting point of philosophy should be metaphysics rather than epistemology. The ambitious project he pursued is undoubtedly important and original, especially in the first part of Spoznaja i spoznajna teorija (Cognition and Epistemology), where his subtle analysis of consciousness convincingly shows, at the very least, that any account of knowledge and cognition must take into account the basic structure of experience. However, we maintain that the conclusions drawn in the second part of the book concerning the status of epistemology require a more detailed and compelling justification.
Ključne riječi
cognition; epistemology; experience; metaphysics; Pavao Vuk-Pavlović; theory of objects
Hrčak ID:
340982
URI
Datum izdavanja:
15.12.2025.
Posjeta: 376 *